基于CEC系统舰艇编队防空作战最小共享信息集研究

根据最小共享信息集的概念,提出了基于CEC系统舰艇编队协同防空作战的智能系统模型,分析了舰艇编队CEC系统的作战功能和作战信息,提出了确定舰艇编队协同防空作战的最小共享信息集的事件法,并应用信息论证明了事件法的确能够减少通信的信息量。在上述基础上,确定了舰艇编队协同防空作战的最小共享信息集。     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

舰载反潜直升机协同作战效能评估

协同作战效能评估可为舰载反潜直升机装备发展和协同作战指挥提供依据和参考。通过对协同作战效能评估研究现状的分析,提出一种采用模糊综合评判进行协同作战效能评估的方法。首先,对影响协同作战效能的指标进行分类,建立多层指标体系;其次,构建基于模糊综合评判的数学模型,对不同类型指标进行规范化处理,并采用AHP法确定指标权重;最后通过对某型机的协同作战效能进行评估,验证所提方法的有效性和可行性。     

双站协同侦察雷达信号分选新方法

针对复杂信号环境下雷达对抗情报侦察面临的信号分选问题,提出一种基于双站协同侦察的雷达信号分选新方法。根据不同位置雷达的脉冲信号到达两个侦察接收站的时间差不同进行信号分选。在满足误差的要求下,求解该方法的分选模糊区域,分析分选性能。调整布站,优化分选性能,提高分选准确性。理论分析和计算机仿真表明,该方法可以较好地解决制约雷达对抗情报获取中的信号分选瓶颈难题。     

机动目标的航空集群协同探测策略

航空集群协同探测问题,是集群作战研究的重要内容,其中对隐身目标在不同机动,不同极化方式下的集群动态RCS研究是重点和难点问题。在双基地雷达建模和坐标转换的前提下,对隐身目标的两种典型机动——匀加速机动和匀速转弯机动进行建模,在HH、VV两种极化方式下,运用线性插值法对动态RCS进行时序分析。仿真结果表明,两种机动模型下,随着时间变化,动态RCS起伏波动较大,在匀加速运动模型下,HH、VV极化所引起的RCS差异性较大,匀速转弯模型下,不同极化方式带来的影响较小。     

面向联合作战行动设计的态势差分析机理研究

文章介绍了态势差的概念内涵,分析了在设计联合作战行动时为什么要分析态势差,阐述了如何分析态势差。态势差分析是工程化作战筹划的一个环节,研究态势差分析机理,能为作战行动设计提供有力支撑,提高作战筹划效率。     

抗击临近空间高超声速飞行器对策研究

在未来的空袭作战中,临近空间高超声速飞行器具有其他武器所不可比拟的优势,它必将成为一种新威胁。首先分析了该飞行器的卓越性能,简述了它的军事用途,其次论述了它的出现对防空反导体系所产生的影响,最后针对这种新型的威胁,提出了几点应对措施。     

舰艇编队协同作战的空中目标威胁评估研究

从系统分析舰艇编队协同作战的空中目标威胁评估问题入手,深入研究了协同作战环境下编队空中目标威胁评估的基本过程。在此基础上,针对编队协同决策的特点,建立了基于两层决策的协同作战环境下编队空中目标威胁评估模型,从而提出了舰艇编队协同作战的空中目标威胁评估方法。最后,通过实例说明了所提方法的有效性。     

基于变异离散粒子群的协同空战攻击决策算法

为了提高智能协同空战攻击决策算法性能,将变异策略引入到DPSO(Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization)协同空战攻击决策算法中,提出了一种新的基于变异离散粒子群(Mutation Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization,MDPSO)的协同空战攻击决策算法。基于典型空战想定背景,仿真验证了算法的有效性。采用对比实验方法,基于准确性、可靠性和快速性等关键性能指标,分析比较了基于MDPSO协同空战攻击决策算法与多种智能决策算法,验证了基于MDPSO的协同空战攻击决策算法有着较好的综合性能。