基于CSCW的机关业务协同办公系统协作多用户界面研究

简要阐述了研究CSCW系统协作多用户界面的必要性,介绍了协作多用户界面的基本概念,分析并评价了几种传统的协作多用户界面体系结构,最后以某机关业务协同办公系统的协作多用户界面的设计为例,提出了一种协同混合式体系结构及具体的实现。     

基于共进化的多任务分配与调度

在考虑多种约束关系基础上 ,提出一种并行与分布式系统中多约束关系的任务分配与调度的共同进化遗传算法。仿真试验结果表明所给算法比传统单种遗传算法更能有效地进行多任务分配与调度 ,具有一定的工程价值     

多目标灰关联决策的典型水面舰艇反潜性能评估

水面舰艇反潜武器系统具有综合功能强、战技性能指标多的特点,许多指标模糊性、相对性较强,必须寻求一种能对武器系统战技技能进行有效评估的方法,采用多目标灰关联决策的方法对水面舰艇反潜武器系统战技技能进行评估.首先根据灰色系统理论建立了多目标灰关联决策模型,其次以灰色关联度为基本依据构造出水面舰艇反潜武器战技性能评估指数,最后根据所建立的模型对5种典型水面舰艇的反潜性能进行了综合评估.     

反映作战协同的兵力损耗微分方程

基于现代战争作战体系对抗中作战单位损耗相关性,在兰彻斯特平方律基础上引入协同系数概念,加入相关性指标.建立了反映作战协同的兵力损耗微分方程.以作战双方各有两个作战单位参战的具体模型为例进行分析,给出了随战斗时间演变的作战双方兵力变化值,绘出了相应兵力损耗曲线.分析结果表明,在作战双方初始战斗力不等的情况下,协同水平的高低有可能成为决定战斗结果的关键因素.该兵力损耗模型对于研究现代协同作战具有一定意义.     

CEC条件下舰艇编队目标武器分配研究

在分析CEC条件下舰艇编队目标武器分配模式的基础上,综合运用MAS理论与方法,建立了舰艇编队目标武器分配MAS模型,即利用Agent描述舰艇编队的各种物理资源或逻辑资源,通过网络及Agent通讯协议将多个Agent连接成一个整体系统,设计了映射实体功能的Agent结构,从而为舰艇编队目标武器分配决策提供了一条新途径.     

基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略

以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。     

基于判别分析阈值滤波协作通信系统信道估计

在基于正交频分复用技术的放大转发协作通信系统中,针对传统信道估计算法估计精度差的问题,提出一种基于判别分析阈值滤波离散傅立叶变换信道估计算法。该算法首先通过设置改进的阈值门限初步获得信道有效抽头,然后利用马氏距离判别分析对已检测出的信道抽头修正。仿真结果表明:和传统方法相比,提出方法有效地滤除了信道估计中的噪声,改善了信道估计精度和误码率性能。     

群决策理论在多机协同空战机动决策中的应用

针对近距空战中多架战机对空中的多个敌对目标进行协同攻击的机动决策问题进行了研究。将群决策理论引入多机协同空战机动决策,首先确定了决策成员与候选方案,然后基于战场态势评估提出了采用风险决策准则的偏好排序确定方法,给出了集结偏好的序数型群决策方法。在不同空战想定条件下进行仿真,结果表明,该方法合理、可行,具有良好的应用前景。     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013