The security sector and the plunder of Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa alluvial diamonds: the ‘goat mentality’ in practice

While the human rights impact of the deployment of state security agencies in the Chiadzwa diamond fields has been explored, it is important to continue to expose the increasing tendency within the sector to take public resources that should be protected by the state and used for the benefit of the people and channel them for personal gain. The security sector stranglehold of President Robert Mugabe and the ruling political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has facilitated the siphoning of Chiadzwa diamond revenue into the pockets of individual security personnel. The unfolding sociopolitical crisis in Zimbabwe has also meant that these security personnel have been deployed beyond conflict zones and into traditionally civilian domains, with dire consequences for the public purse. With this in mind, it is asserted that these issues have driven state security agencies to enrich themselves through what is termed in this article as a ‘goat mentality’. The article thus explores the ways in which state security agencies have been deployed and gone on to promote personal enrichment in the Chiadzwa diamond fields.     

Herdsmen militancy and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: A theoretical briefing

This article explores the phenomenon of herdsmen militancy as a new trajectory for the farmer–herder crisis in Nigeria, with reference to its humanitarian implications. Relying on a systematic analysis of secondary data and aligning with the analytical anchorage of liberal political ecology theory, the article posits that herdsmen militancy depicts a contradiction in agrarian relations in the context of a national security crisis which has been complicated by salient socio-ecological factors such as climate change, armed violence, and identity politics. In view of the dire humanitarian consequences of this situation, the article submits that herdsmen militancy constitutes a major threat to human and national security in Nigeria. It makes a case for a pragmatic policy capable of mitigating the myriad socio-ecological factors that tend to trigger herdsmen militancy, with prohibition on open grazing in critical hotbeds of herder–farmer conflict as a strategic measure.     

金融危机对我国社会稳定的影响及对策

金融危机的爆发和蔓延对我国实体经济造成了严重冲击,境内外敌对势力趁机发难,人民内部矛盾被“催化”,经济领域的违法活动凸显,公安机关作为我国的重要维稳力量,应增强维稳意识,提高执法素养;深入推进社区和农村警务战略;强化情报建设、舆论引导和群众工作;坚持科技强警,完善各项维稳预案。以积极的策略应对金融危机对我国社会稳定的影响。     

The ‘first’ surge: the repulse of the Easter Invasion in South Vietnam, 1972 – implications for Iraq and Afghanistan

In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking.     

Are police deaths a consequence of flaws in the South African Police Service administration? A SWOT analysis

This article argues that since the advent of democracy, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has been plagued by poor administration. Having inherited a repressive police force, the post-apartheid national police commissioners (NPCs) have found it difficult to transform the organisation. Among the unintended consequences has been a rise in police deaths. Although police deaths can be attributed to numerous factors, this article focuses on fault lines in the SAPS administration through a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis drawing largely on existing scholarly debates. Essential theoretical perspectives have been employed to gain insight into the root causes of the problem. The article concludes that poor administration and a lack of trust, partnership and collaboration between police officers and community members have perpetuated the killing of police officers. These killings are further compounded by the flawed and ill-conceived selection and appointment of NPCs. As a consequence, the article recommends that the appointment of NPCs should be promptly reviewed. It further recommends that each potential candidate should have risen through the ranks and must fully comprehend the challenges facing the organisation.     

The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace

In this paper, I critically analyse the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), as it relates to the responsibility of intervening forces towards the people they claim to protect and the challenges that the situation in Libya now poses in the region and for the African Union (AU). I focus most of my attention on the coercive elements of the RtoP framework (Pillar III). This is the most contested element in the framework. Three questions guide this article: were there legitimate grounds to justify an external intervention in Libya? In the words of Hugh Roberts in Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go, ‘[w]hat if anything has Libya got in exchange for all the death and destruction that have been visited on it’ since 2011? What are the practical implications and consequences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, led by the United States (US), for regional peace? I discuss the problems surrounding the US–NATO intervention, followed by an analysis of the various positions and narratives leading up to the intervention, the framing and justifications provided for the intervention, and an analysis of the AU's proposal for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. I analyse the various debates that took place in the US (Pentagon/White House), at the United Nations, among scholars in the West and in Africa, and among various actors who tried to broker a ceasefire in Libya before and during the intervention. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for regional peace.     

The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions.     

Improvise,adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building,culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.     

US-American Intervention in Europe: Morality,Justice, and Freedom in World War II Cinema

This article analyzes the American intervention in Nazi-oppressed Europe during World War II and the way in which this intervention is represented in film. Examining the visual and cinematic aesthetics of Saving Private Ryan and the mini-series Band of Brothers, the article seeks to demonstrate how film has responded to US intervention overseas. It is argued that the need to liberate Europe from the evil Other stands forth as the main, heavily moralized purpose of US military intrusion in the film and the mini-series being analyzed. To shore up this speculation, the author considers other films on the topic, namely, The Longest Day (1962) and Shutter Island (2009). The author claims that the scenes in the concentration camps that are crucial in Band of Brothers and Shutter Island have an ethical function, i.e. they justify US intervention in the foreign territory. Additionally, the article provides a brief overview of Playing for Time (1980), Schindler’s List (1993), The Devil’s Arithmetic (1999), The Grey Zone (2001), as well as the mini-series Holocaust (1978).     

From stopping to preventing atrocities

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) provides for the right of the continental body to intervene in the face of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. According to its formulation, Article 4(h) intervention entails military force, which is triggered when a target state fails to discharge its duty to protect its population from mass atrocities. Although Article 4(h) is an ambitious statutory commitment to intervene in a member state by the AU, the Libyan crisis in 2011 showed the ambivalence of the continental institution to act in a decisive and timely manner. The AU's failure to invoke Article 4(h) exposed the need for building the capacity and political will to intervene and to interpret Article 4(h). Therefore, the primary focus of this article is on how Article 4(h) should be interpreted. Flowing from the Pretoria Principles, which seek to provide clarity on the implementation of the AU's right of intervention, Article 4(h) should be viewed as a duty rather than a right to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The duty dimension of Article 4(h) derives from the international instruments that AU member states have ratified to prevent mass atrocities. Rather than being a paper tiger, Article 4(h) should be used in a proactive and timely manner as a military option available to the AU to persuade member states to prevent or halt atrocities. As a last resort, military force pursuant to Article 4(h) should aim at protecting the population at risk and pursuing the perpetrators in order to avoid contravening Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Although military intervention can save lives in the short term, it cannot necessarily address the underlying, structural causes of atrocities, such as ethnic rivalries, economic inequalities and scramble for natural resources, among others. Therefore, the prevention of mass atrocities should not be equated with, or be seen through the prism of, Article 4(h) intervention alone. The focus should instead be on the entire spectrum of preventive strategies at the disposal of the AU in the face of mass atrocities, including the African human rights system and the African Peer Review Mechanism.