坦克嵌入式车场射击训练炮长操纵控制模型

在嵌入式射击模拟训练系统中,针对炮长操作过程对模拟训练的影响,建立了炮长操纵控制模型。炮长操纵控制模型包括炮长操纵模型和炮长射击决策模型。炮长操纵模型的建立是基于装备的物理模型和人的生理反应模型。炮长射击决策模型根据坦克射击教范要求,采用与/或正向演绎推理得到。在炮长操纵控制模型基础上,建立了射击反应时间模型,并与实际装备操作进行了比较,对建立的操纵控制模型进行了验证。     

微分对策及其在军事领域的研究进展*

介绍了微分对策的产生背景及其半个多世纪以来的发展历程,简述了国内外微分对策理论发展的几个重要阶段及其标志性成果。全面地阐述了国内外关于微分对策在军事领域的应用研究状况,特别是美、俄等军事强国在微分对策军事应用研究方面的现状以及我国研究人员在该领域的主要研究成果。还进一步论述了微分对策在军事应用研究方面存在的问题,并对微分对策的发展前景做出了展望,指出了微分对策在军事应用领域中的研究热点、难点和主要发展方向。     

基于组合熵权的联合作战目标选择模型研究

针对作战中目标选择与排序问题,分析确定了8种在联合作战条件下影响目标选择关键因素。在此基础上应用多属性决策理论,以组合熵权系数确定指标权重,建立了目标选择模型。模型简洁易于实现,并且在决策中有效减少了主观随意性。最后通过仿真实例说明了模型的有效性和可操作性。     

LDPC-Coded MIMO-OFDM系统的一种判决反馈信道估计算法

研究了LDPC编码在MIMO-OFDM系统中的应用,提出了基于LDPC编码的MIMO-OFDM系统的一种改进判决反馈信道估计算法,该算法一方面利用多步预测和干扰对消技术改进了判决反馈算法的精度,另一方面利用空时解码后的序列和LDPC译码后的序列进行了两级反馈信道估计。该算法在利用LDPC码优异的低误码性能改善信道估计精度的同时,有效地改进了LDPC帧过长导致时变信道条件下的信道估计不精确的问题。     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Noncooperative cost spanning tree games with budget restrictions

We extend the noncooperative game associated with the cost spanning tree problem introduced by Bergantiños and Lorenzo (Math Method Oper Res 59(2004), 393–403) to situations where agents have budget restrictions. We study the Nash equilibria, subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and strong Nash equilibria of this game. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

基于RS理论的电子对抗装备编配辅助决策方法

根据电子对抗装备编配的主要特点,提出利用RS(RoughSet)理论探索装备编配问题。综合考虑影响装备编配的各种因素,建立起知识表达系统,并且约简得到一些相对简单的编配规则;然后再根据实际情况,结合数学规划方法进行装备编配优化。分析结果表明,运用RS理论,能够较好地用定性与定量的方法解决电子对抗装备编配问题。     

基于改进核极限学习机和集成学习理论的目标机动轨迹预测

为了提高目标轨迹预测的精度以及预测模型的泛化能力,提出基于改进蝙蝠算法优化的核极限学习机(Kernel Extreme Learning Machine,KELM)和集成学习理论目标机动轨迹预测模型.构建KELM模型,并采用改进的蝙蝠算法对KELM的参数进行优化;以优化后的KELM神经网络为弱预测器,结合集成学习算法生...     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

Reconsidering the Legal Equality of Combatants

ABSTRACT

The legal equality of combatants (LEC) is a fixture of international law and just war theory. Both scholars who embrace and those who reject the moral equality of combatants seem committed to the legal equality of combatants. Their reasons usually include pragmatic worries about unjust combatants committing even more harm if they were to be simply prohibited from fighting. In this article I argue that this sweeping commitment to the legal equality of combatants is mistaken and that it is often grounded in a misunderstanding of the way international law governs behavior.