Military Spending and Growth: The Role of Institutions

Recent literature on whether military spending affects economic growth argues that the relationship may be a conditional one. We add to this literature by considering the role that ‘good institutions’ play in the effect of military spending on growth. Using data from a sample of over 100 countries from 1988 to 2010, our analysis suggests that the effect of military spending on growth is generally negative or zero at best, and this effect is mitigated in the presence of good economic and political institutions.     

Burden sharing and the future of NATO: wandering between two worlds

The US role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance is a 65-year history of retrenchment and renewal. When Washington has sought a retrenchment from the world, it traditionally increased burden sharing pressure on Europe to do more. During times of increased global ambition, the USA reaffirmed its traditional leadership role in the Alliance and its commitment to NATO effectiveness and relevance. This cycle of NATO retrenchment and renewal, however, is halting. Though the USA will continue to go through periods of relative increases and decreases in security policy ambition, signs point to a permanent defense and security retrenchment in Europe. Germany is the ally singularly capable of filling the resulting security gap. If NATO is to avoid the drift toward irrelevance many critics have predicted, Germany will need to cast off old inhibitions toward security and defense leadership. These trends and their implications for NATO's future are explored through historical case studies and the shifting contemporary security environment.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

国防知识产权运营市场化研究

提高国防知识产权转化应用水平,关键是解决制约国防知识产权转化应用的体制机制问题。可借鉴普通知识产权运营经验,以市场化方式促进国防知识产权运营工作。针对当前运营中出现的市场失灵现象,从创新政府治理模式、引入市场机制、增强法律法规建设、搭建公共服务平台等途径入手,逐步理顺政府与市场的关系,进行国防知识产权运营市场化改革。     

防空火力单元射击有利度计算方法

根据防空作战的实际,分析了传统算法在计算防空火力单元射击有利度过程中存在的局限性,引入了防空火力单元可射击系数、电磁环境修正系数这两个参数,并结合高炮、地空导弹武器系统的差异,对防空火力单元可射击系数、电磁环境修正系数这两个参数的具体计算方法进行了介绍。在此基础之上,对传统算法进行了改进,提高了防空火力单元射击有利度计算算法的合理性和科学性。     

区域反导指控系统一体化研究

不断发展的TBM突防技术呈现了许多新特点,对防空反导系统的指挥控制能力提出了更高的要求.必须从对TBM的感知、识别、预报、威胁判断、目标分配、火力拦截和效能评估等诸多控制环节进行一体化设计,而信息网络技术的发展又为联合一体化指控这一必然选择提供了可能,通过高速数据链将各个作战平台连接成为无缝战场态势,从而形成一体化的扁平作战体系.通过研究国内外指控系统的发展现状,给出了我军的一体化指控系统的发展建议.     

巡航导弹综合防御系统仿真研究

巡航导弹超低空突防效果好、命中精度高、价格低廉,这些优越的性能使其在近几次局部战争中大显身手,越来越受到世界各国的高度重视,也促使各国纷纷研究巡航导弹及其防御措施.国内对巡航导弹的防御研究多从电子对抗与火力打击两方面分别入手,缺乏对巡航导弹的综合防御系统及其仿真的研究.为了更好地研究巡航导弹的综合防御问题,在分析巡航导弹防御方法的基础上,提出构建对巡航导弹进行软硬对抗的综合防御系统,并建立了基于DIS的综合防御系统仿真框架,介绍了系统的体系结构和模型体系,对进一步深化巡航导弹防御研究具有重要的意义.     

基于灰色关联分析的防空兵力编组方案优选

要地防空中需要研究的问题很多,其中要地防空兵力编组方案优选是研究的重点问题之一,首先对灰关联分析方法和要地防空兵力编组的关联性进行了分析,然后在兵力部署要求的基础上,建立了评价指标体系及其量化分析,最后采用灰关联分析方法建立了方案优选模型,具体的实例验证了基于灰关联分析的兵力编组优选模型的可行性和有效性,为要地防空兵力编组方案的优选问题提供了一种量化的新思路。     

潜艇使用自航式声诱饵防御声自导鱼雷模型研究

针对潜艇如何使用自航式声诱饵防御声自导鱼雷,分析了自航式声诱饵的初始航向范围,并建立了相应的防御模型.然后采用线性规划方法,求取最优的潜艇规避角度和诱饵航向.最后时典型态势进行仿真计算,结果表明,采用该方法得出的结果与实际作战基本符合,从而验证了模型的正确性.     

基于海上遥控平台的防空武器拦截空靶试验方法

针对近程防空武器系统拦截空中靶标试验面临的主要问题,结合未来空中靶标的发展及武器系统的试验需求,提出了以海上无人试验平台为载体,加装近程防空武器系统,并通过遥控方式,实现对空中靶标进行拦截的试验方法.分析表明,该方法在目前具有较好的可行性.