African nations as proxies in covert cyber operations

The growth of the African Internet, and services related to the Internet, has been rapid over the last decade. Following this market expansion, a variety of service providers have started to provide access. A fast-growing market puts pressure on the providers to deliver services first and only then seek to secure the networks. Over time, industrialised nations have become more able to detect and trace cyber attacks against their networks. These tracking features are constantly developing and the precision in determining the origin of an attack is increasing. A state-sponsored cyber attacker, such as intelligence agencies and electronic warfare units, will seek to avoid detection, especially when the attacks are politically sensitive intelligence-gathering and intrusion forays into foreign states' networks. One way for the attacker to create a path that links the attacks and the originating country is by actions through a proxy. The less technologically mature developing nations offer an opportunity for cyber aggression due to their lower level of security under the quick expansion of the Internet-based market. Developing countries could be used as proxies, without their knowledge and consent, through the unauthorised usage of these countries' information systems in an attempt to attack a third country by a state-sponsored offensive cyber operation. If the purpose of the cyber attack is to destabilise a targeted society and the attack succeeds, the used proxies are likely to face consequences in their relations with foreign countries, even if the proxy was unaware of the covert activity.     

基于信息链的防空作战体系能力分析方法

针对要地防空指挥控制系统的组成、结构和功能,通过双层图对作战体系结构进行建模,提出体现作战体系作战业务流程、信息连通性的双层信息链搜索和解析方法,实现了将信息链与作战体系能力分析的有机关联。仿真验证表明,该方法有效地体现了在作战体系能力分析中,各类型作战实体的协作性和连通性,提高了作战体系作战能力与体系结构的融合能力,利于作战体系的作战效能评估。     

舰载近区防卫武器综合运用

水面舰艇近区防卫武器的作战运用研究是舰载武器作战运用研究的新课题。在分析近区防卫目标特征、武器特点、作战方法的基础上,提出近区防卫武器综合运用一般原则,基于作战时域的连续性及效果的叠加性,构建近区防卫武器使用逻辑结构,建立武器运用的对策模型,可为近区防卫武器的科学使用提供理论参考。     

舰载预警机防空预警探测距离需求分析

提出了一种舰载预警机防空预警探测距离需求确定方法。首先对舰载预警机执行防空预警作战进行了描述,为满足拦截机对敌突击飞机进行成功拦截,预警机的预警探测距必须大于一个阈值,即所需最小预警探测距离。其次分析了舰载预警机所需最小防空预警探测距离与敌突击飞机速度、航母防空拦截机响应时间和速度之间的关系,构建了舰载预警机防空所需最小预警探测距离计算模型;最后应用典型案例,计算了多种防空想定下舰载预警机所需最小预警探测距离,仿真分析了敌突击飞机速度和航母防空拦截机速度对舰载预警机防空所需最小预警探测距离的影响。论文的研究结果为舰载预警机装备研制和作战使用提供决策依据。     

Hoping for the Best,preparing for the worst: China's response to US hegemony

In the post-Cold War strategic environment, Beijing could plausibly have opted for Soviet-style geostrategic competition with Washington, but it has not. Chinese leaders have not thus far, and almost certainly will never, amass thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert or deploy significant forces to a network of bases spanning the globe. Nevertheless, the below assessment of China's increasing hard and soft power yields the conclusion that a Chinese challenge to US hegemony cannot be ruled out. The United States must prudently maintain military forces appropriate to facing a potential peer competitor. At the same time, however, Washington must engage in a process of creative diplomacy that simultaneously matches China's soft power and engages seriously with Beijing to create areas of consensus and cooperation.     

The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation — locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953.     

海军舰艇编队防空导弹协同作战技术研究

主要以信息化条件下如何提升海军舰艇编队防空导弹作战能力为背景,重点描述协同指挥和协同制导作战的概念内涵、国内外研究现状、作战模式、主要实现的功能,给出不同指挥层次下各指挥节点的体系结构和功能定位,进而从信息场和功能界面等方面说明协同指挥和协同制导2个功能层次的区别.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS

This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years.     

Remaking the military industrial relationship: A French‐American comparison

Defense industrial complexes in leading Cold War nations have downsized and reallocated resources to other productive activities in the 1990s. In this paper, we analyze the experience of two key countries ‐ the US and France. Comparing the two countries, we find similar outcomes in budgetary retrenchment and large firm restructuring but marked differences in the pace of downsizing and diversification among small and medium‐sized firms. We hypothesize that three sets of contextual differences may explain these differences: 1) institutional differences in the way that the State bureaucracies ‐ the Pentagon and the French Délégation générale pour l'armement (DGA) ‐ oversee defense industrial matters, 2) differences in military industry ownership and firm size patterns, and 3) differences in the regional distribution of defense industrial capacity and associated regional policies. In closing, we note that the two countries’ defense industrial complexes are becoming more alike and speculate on the significance of invidious competition and interactions between them. We address briefly the future of French/American arms industrial competition and cooperation, given the trend towards transnational security arrangements and defense industry globalization