WHEN THE COLD WAR WAS HOT

15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation, by L. Douglas Keeney. St. Martin's Press, 2011. 384 pages, $27.     

‘Clean’ bombs: Nuclear technology and nuclear strategy in the 1950s

The idea of ‘clean’ bombs, nuclear weapons with a reduced amount of radioactive fallout resulting from their fission part, has met much ridicule since its public inauguration in 1956. Many scholars have regarded the bombs as a propaganda tool, stopping short of analyzing their role in the transformative phase of US nuclear strategy in the 1950s. This paper reexamines the clean bomb episode through 1958, shedding light upon the dynamic relationship between the development of nuclear weapons technology and the evolution of nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. It also discusses the mechanism and momentum of nuclear weapons technology innovation until the US suspended nuclear testing in late 1958.     

基于Mamdani模糊推理的核动力装置技术状态评估

分析了传统二元逻辑应用于核动力装置部分失效技术状态评估时的局限性,概述了Mamdani模糊推理的基本技术;结合状态评估实例,提出了基于Mamdani模糊推理的核动力装置系统级的技术状态评估方法,为系统部分失效的技术状态评估提供了一种新的技术途径。     

Africa and the 2015 NPT Review Conference

African states' attendance at and participation in the preparations for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has produced mixed results, with the continent acting as both agent and bystander in respect of certain issues. African agency is evident in, for example, its position as a member of groupings on Iran's nuclear weapons programme and the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Less agency is evident in states' individual actions. This underscores the importance of African states' preference for multilateralism. However, African agency is also less evident in African multilateral efforts at the NPT preparatory meetings. The impact of these developments on the 2015 NPT Review Conference is too soon to tell but may bode ill for African agency.     

Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.     

Special Section: Nuclear Stability In South Asia

The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region.     

French Nuclear Diplomacy

“French nuclear diplomacy” is the French government's use of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) to advance specific commercial and strategic interests. During the heart of the so-called nuclear renaissance, the Élysée Palace aggressively peddled France's nuclear expertise and technology abroad, signing over a dozen new NCAs in an effort to bring in business for the French industry, forge diplomatic relationships, and promote global nonproliferation norms. Several years later, however, the outcomes of France's aggressive global nuclear power push appear nominal at best. This article explores the mixed results of this nuclear campaign, and through three case studies, illustrates how many of France's commercial and political disappointments stem from unrealistic expectations and the disorganization of the French nuclear complex.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency versus opacity

Due to expanding and increasing religious extremism and terrorism coupled with political instability in Pakistan, most western observers believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and could be taken over by terrorists. This would have adverse implications for the region and for global peace, especially for the security of USA and Europe. This article argues that this perception is based on a flawed understanding and knowledge of how Pakistan's command and control setup has evolved and operates. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are as safe as any other state's nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also been active in supporting and participating in global efforts to improve nuclear safety and security. Over the years, Pakistan has been quite open in sharing information regarding how it is improving its command and control system with western governments as well as scholars. This article argues that the steps Pakistan has taken to secure its nuclear weapons are adequate and that Pakistan would continue to further strengthen these measures; however, it is the expanding religious extremism, terrorism and anti-Americanism in the country which make the international perception of Pakistan extremely negative and then seep into the perception of Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety and security.