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排序方式: 共有257条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
251.
以可靠性为中心的维修(RCM)发展动态 总被引:21,自引:1,他引:20
概述了以可靠性为中心的维修 (RCM )的发展过程 ,以 1997年版的《RCMⅡ》为主要参照 ,从 8个方面综述了RCM的发展动态 相似文献
252.
Lukas Milevski 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(3):300-313
ABSTRACT The post-Cold War period nearly up to the present has been characterised as the age of liberal wars, yet key facets of the liberal guidance of war remain under appreciated. This article seeks to address this wider gap with regard to the particular concern of war termination and the fulfilment or failure of policy. First, it develops characterisations of liberal wars based on the existing literature, identifying three broad types through consideration of context—defensive versus offensive—and of political and strategic agency, particularly regarding the motives for and intents of action. Three types of liberal wars result: defensive liberal wars, offensive liberal wars with humanitarian motive and geopolitical intent, and offensive liberal wars with geopolitical motive and humanitarian intent. The article then presents one exemplary case for each liberal war with an emphasis on how liberal strategy required an illiberal ally and that ally's effect on the subsequent peace. 相似文献
253.
Frank O’Donnell 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):407-426
ABSTRACTThe India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning. 相似文献
254.
Diana Wueger 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):449-463
ABSTRACTIn 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course. 相似文献
255.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):465-479
ABSTRACTOver the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force. 相似文献
256.
257.
ABSTRACTThe aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia. 相似文献