ESCAPE FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero.     

THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity—a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned.     

Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces

The Indian government has not made a public comment about the status of its nuclear weapon program since approving a nuclear doctrine in 2003. However, there is now enough information in the public domain to determine that the command-and-control system for the nuclear program has steadily matured in accordance with the intent of the approved nuclear doctrine. The Indian government has successfully mitigated many of the issues that plague the conventional military. The result is a basic command-and-control system that is focused only on the delivery, if ordered by the prime minister, of nuclear weapons. The system is not as robust as those of the United States and Russia, but is in place and ready as new Indian nuclear weapons enter into operation. The command-and-control system is developing to meet India's needs and political compulsions, but not necessarily as part of a more assertive nuclear policy.     

The Moral Dimension of “Global Zero”

Regrettably, moral arguments are largely absent from the current debate on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, complementing politico-strategic thinking with ethical categories could significantly strengthen the abolitionist call. To fill the gap, this article analyzes the evolution of the nuclear ethics of the Roman Catholic Church and especially its position on nuclear deterrence. If this strategy was granted interim and strictly conditioned moral acceptance during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is today increasingly considered ineffective, an obstacle to genuine disarmament, and hence morally unjustifiable. In the new security context, the conditions for the Catholic Church's “interim nuclear ethics” have altered, and nuclear disarmament has become a feasible option and an alternative strategy to deterrence.     

North Korea,deterrence, and engagement

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.     

节点非独立失效下的局域网可靠性建模与分析

以具有层次结构的局域网作为拓扑模型,考虑共因失效和关联失效这2类节点非独立失效事件发生的情况,建立了交换机节点失效模型来模拟交换机失效,利用Monte-Carlo仿真算法近似计算出网络的两端可靠性,研究2种共因失效事件和3种关联失效事件对网络端端可靠性的影响。结果表明:因资源节点出现故障和协议层出现错误而导致交换机失效的共因失效事件均会降低网络可靠性,且资源节点失效概率或协议层失效概率越大,网络可靠性越低;而由于使用了热备份技术、堆叠技术以及发生广播风暴导致的关联失效事件,即使节点独立失效概率很小,只要相关因数足够大,故障都会快速传播,导致网络可靠性迅速下降。     

From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture

The recent Russian approach to strategy has linked nuclear, conventional and informational (cyber) tools of influence into one integrated mechanism. The article traces the intellectual history of this Russian cross-domain concept, discusses its essence and highlights its destabilising effects. By analysing a case outside of Western strategic thought, it demonstrates how strategic concepts evolve differently in various cultural realms and argues for a tailored approach for exploring coercion policies of different actors. The findings of the study are applicable beyond the Russian case, and relevant to scholars and actors exploring, utilising or responding to cross-domain coercion strategy.     

基于ADC的炮兵激光观测仪侦察效能分析

运用了效能分析方法,针对复杂战场环境下炮兵侦察系统的效能进行分析,特别是炮兵激光观测仪,揭示其内在规律,为提高现有侦察装备的作战效能找到重要途径,也为指挥员的决策提供可靠的战略支持.在侦察系统效能分析理论的基础上,对典型的激光观测仪侦察装备进行了计算评估验证,其方法和成果可供其他武器系统效能评估时借鉴参考.     

铝合金表面涂覆隐身吸波涂层脱落原因分析

通过对某装备车体外脱落隐身吸波涂层样品的表面形貌、截面形貌、元素组成及含量分析,发现吸波涂层和Al2O3钝化层之间没有化学结合键,只存在物理吸附和机械结合,在外部环境的作用下,很容易引起隐身吸波涂层的脱落。     

考虑运行故障的工程安全设施使用检查可用度模型

使用检查是发现工程安全设施系统隐蔽功能故障的有效措施。在考虑检查期间可能发生运行故障的前提下,建立了基于使用检查策略的系统可用度模型。应用该模型对应急柴油发电机的使用检查过程进行可用度分析,确定了其最优检查问隔期和给定可用度条件下的检查间隔期区间;探讨了检查时间和维修时间对可用度的影响。研究表明,该模型对于工程安全设施系统的可用度分析是有效可行的,其结果能够为维修决策提供依据。