Challenges of institutional coordination in complex defense acquisition programs: the case of the Republic of Korea’s F-X program

Decision-making in defense acquisition programs in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been problematic, especially in highly advanced complex systems. The highly disputed force modernization program for the ROK Air Force’s fifth-generation fighter, dubbed the Fighter eXperiment, went through extreme turbulence during the type selection phase. The gist of the turbulence became evident through poor institutional coordination within the defense acquisition authorities that eventually forced them to rescind the decision generated from their own yearlong efforts, thus basically shooting themselves on the foot. The paper highlights the background of the program and reviews the institutional elements that influenced the decision-making process, and conclude that the absence of an effective coordination mechanism has made decision-making in complex defense programs even more troublesome.     

基于微分对策的潜艇鱼雷攻击占位问题研究

针对潜艇鱼雷攻击占位问题,建立占位方案分析和优化的微分对策模型,采用影子目标法对问题进行简化。证明了在给定规避速度大小的条件下,潜艇最佳规避策略为直线运动。于是利用定性微分对策理论,给出潜艇可占领攻击阵位条件。以占位时间最短为优化目标,建立可占位情形下的占位方案优化模型,即可占位情形下的最短时间占位方案计算模型,给出最短时间占位方案解析计算公式。     

基于虚拟力驱动的传感器网络节点定位

为了解决传感器网络节点三边测量定位的全局优化问题,提出了一种基于虚拟力驱动的节点最优相对定位方法。该方法建立了满足节点位置最优最小二乘估计需要的虚拟势能场模型,给出了一种基于虚拟势能场梯度的虚拟力定义新方法,证明了利用该虚拟力驱动节点定位的收敛性,提供了保证节点定位结果全局最优的方法。仿真分析表明,基于虚拟力驱动的节点相对定位方法能够解决节点相对位置的最优估计问题。     

基于NSGA-II和多属性决策的防空火力分配

为了解决防空火力分配问题,首先运用NSGA-II算法求出Pareto最优解集,然后运用多属性决策方法对Pareto最优解集中的解进行综合评估,并从中找出一个最优解。用区间数定性描述各属性,建立了防空火力分配的三目标优化模型。描述了NSGA-II算法和多属性决策方法的运算步骤。在仿真算例中,得到了一个最佳防空火力分配方案,说明该方法对于防空火力分配问题有良好的应用价值。     

基于单亲遗传算法的战时维修力量抽调模型研究

分析了影响维修力量抽调决策的因素,对装备维修力量的抽调问题进行了数学描述,建立了一种基于灰色关联度的多目标优化模型。针对装备维修力量抽调的非线性多目标优化问题,提出了基于单亲遗传算法的求解方法,该算法用换位算子取代了传统的交叉、变异算子,但仍然保持了他们的进化功能。通过仿真算例分析表明,该方法可有效求解多目标的保障力量抽调问题。     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.