联合作战中空间力量指挥体制方案的仿真评估

联合作战中空间力量指挥体制决定相应指挥体系的效能,有必要通过定理评估对指挥体制方案进行优选和优化,通过仿真评估方案的实体形式--联合作战中空间力量指挥体系的指挥效能来评估对应的指挥体制方案,基于指挥体系活动能力建立了指挥效能指标体系,提出了用于指挥体制方案评估的仿真系统设计方案.     

声对接阵阵元参数控制

提出对声对接阵阵元参数进行控制,以达到提高声对接阵系统精度的目的,并对由于阵元参数改变而引起对接基阵各个阵元之间的交叉耦合的影响以及阵元的近场声压进行了理论分析和计算机仿真计算,结果证明该方法是有效的.     

高压共轨燃油喷射系统结构参数影响的仿真研究

建立了高压共轨燃油喷射系统的模块化数学模型,进行了仿真分析,讨论了主要部件如高压油泵、高压油轨及喷油器的重要结构参数对系统特性的影响,确定了保证系统稳定性的结构参数选取原则.     

支座弹性对压杆临界荷载的影响

在考虑支座弹性的情况下 ,研究了几种常见的压杆结构 ,推导出了计算临界荷载的方程式 ,给出了以稳定系数表示的临界压力的简明表达式及稳定系数列表。由于考虑了支座弹性 ,使本文提出的方法更具有一般意义和工程价值。     

双泵源电液舵机线谱噪声控制

采取变频调速控制策略的电液舵机可大幅降低操舵噪声,但系统线谱噪声明显且随工况变化而迁移,衰减难度大。基于此,结合泵源双冗余的电液舵机原理,仅改变原系统控制策略,提出基于辅助泵源合流的压力脉动控制措施。理论分析指出,两泵源转速一致,初始相位角为半个周期可衰减奇数次谐波。设计了主从同步控制策略,配置相应硬件,并应用于实际系统,实测相同操舵工况下可降低基脚结构振动总级3~5 dB,一阶线谱最大可衰减23 dB。     

内置式耐压液舱实肋板拓扑优化设计方案分析

通过对内置式耐压液舱中实肋板开孔拓扑优化设计后的强度和稳定性分析发现,对于周向范围为162°的内置式耐压液舱,实肋板在中内龙骨附近开孔较优。实肋板开孔后对于其本身的稳定性影响不大,但MISES应力会有所变化;实肋板开孔后,液舱结构的稳定性会稍微降低,后期在进行液舱结构设计时要考虑是否加强。     

内压作用下复合材料修复裂纹管道的失效分析

为准确评估在内压作用下纤维复合材料修复含裂纹管道的有效性及失效压力,建立复合材料修复后裂纹管道的失效数值模型。该数值模型通过扩展有限元法模拟管道裂纹的扩展,利用cohesive单元模拟胶层的脱粘失效,复合材料的失效通过最大应力失效准则进行判定。通过静水压爆裂试验对所提失效数值模型进行验证,实验结果与数值计算结果具有较好的一致性。失效数值分析结果表明:当内压增大至一定值后,未修复管道的初始裂纹沿轴向及壁厚方向逐渐扩展,进而使得管道内壁单元扩展成真实裂纹,此时真实裂纹贯穿整个壁厚方向,即认为裂纹管道发生爆裂失效,爆裂失效压力随初始裂纹半长呈指数形式下降。复合材料修复裂纹管道的不同修复工况呈现相同的失效模式:在单调递增的内压作用下,管道内表面首先出现黏结裂纹,而后其外表面裂纹张开趋势急剧上升,使得复合材料层应力急剧上升,达到极限强度而失效。且对于不同的初始裂纹尺寸,存在对应的复合材料缠绕层数临界值。     

Improvise,adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building,culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.     

Revisiting the justification for an all-volunteer force

In 1968, President Nixon established the Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, or the Gates Commission, which served as the impetus and justification for an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). At the end of its deliberations, the commission recommended abolishing the draft and transforming the U.S. military into a force of volunteers beginning in 1973. Interestingly, the debate regarding the merits of both systems appeared to be largely economic – with cost–benefit analysis playing the primary role. Lately, we are beginning to see a new, politically-motivated impetus for returning to a “system of national service.” The ideas spurring this debate are many: the need to reaffirm the nation state, the commitment of citizens to the state, political ownership and oversight of the forces, the need for social equity in serving the nation, limiting the support for armed conflict by burden-sharing among citizens, and equitably spreading the personal cost of war.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.