基于自适应变异粒子群算法的火力分配方法研究

针对最优火力分配的特点,分析了火力分配优化问题的数学模型,设计了一种求解该类问题的自适应变异粒子群算法（Adaptive Mutation Particle Swarm Optimization, AMPSO）。该算法采用十进制编码方法和基于数值运算的个体更新方法;为平衡算法的局部搜索能力和全局收敛性能,设计了一种关键参数自适应调整方法;为增强种群在进化后期的多样性,提出了一种变异策略。仿真结果表明,所提AMPSO算法具有良好的寻优性能,是优化火力分配的一种有效算法。     

基于半马氏决策过程的电容器维修策略优化

针对电容器随机劣化失效的特点,采用半马氏决策过程解决其预防性维修方案设计和维修策略优化问题.在电容器随机劣化的Gaussian-Poisson模型基础上,以检测周期为优化变量,同时考虑预防性维修次数阈值的影响,建立电容器长期运行费用率优化模型.分析表明,对该型号电容器来说,预防性维修相比于事后修理更加有利于节省部件长期运行的费用率.     

航空集群机载网络Failure-Oblivious路由策略

航空集群机载网络作为集群成员间信息交互的纽带,其路由策略性能优劣直接影响信息传输实时性与可靠性,从而制约网络化集群作战效能发挥.考虑到航空集群机载网络具有诸多不确定性,为应对路由失效以及尽可能避免路由更新,从路由选择算法的角度,在软件定义网络架构下提出Failure-Oblivious路由策略.与传统路由策略不同的是,...     

基于分形理论的微地形的重建

对自然地表分形特征进行了分析和总结,并结合微地形所具有的自然特性,提出了具有方向性分形特征的中点随机位移法。实验结果表明该方法能较好地反映原始数据的总体轮廓,而且还能较好地再现原始微地形的粗糙起伏及各向异性,因而是一种可行的构造三维地形的插值方法。     

‘Clean’ bombs: Nuclear technology and nuclear strategy in the 1950s

The idea of ‘clean’ bombs, nuclear weapons with a reduced amount of radioactive fallout resulting from their fission part, has met much ridicule since its public inauguration in 1956. Many scholars have regarded the bombs as a propaganda tool, stopping short of analyzing their role in the transformative phase of US nuclear strategy in the 1950s. This paper reexamines the clean bomb episode through 1958, shedding light upon the dynamic relationship between the development of nuclear weapons technology and the evolution of nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. It also discusses the mechanism and momentum of nuclear weapons technology innovation until the US suspended nuclear testing in late 1958.     

Russian Reactions to Reagan's ‘Maritime Strategy’

The US Navy's audacious Maritime Strategy of the 1980s is often credited with acting as a key catalyst to the demise of the USSR. In assessing the role of strategic missile submarine “bastions” in the country's overall military strategy, the authors are skeptical of the above thesis, explaining that Moscow actually viewed deployments of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles on to US submarines (versus direct threats against the Soviet Navy itself) as the most alarming threat. The authors concede that the arms race played a role in the collapse of the USSR, but deny a direct connection with Soviet naval development citing the relatively minor naval proportion of overall defense spending. For the difficulties facing the fleet at the end of the Cold War, they instead blame deep systemic problems internal to the Soviet Navy.     

Major Stepan Stebelski of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: examples of insurgency leadership and tactics

This is a biographical analysis of Stepan Stebelski (‘Khrin’) and his time in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. His military command is an example of classic insurgency tactics and strategies. He was trained in underground tactics before the Second World War, used his image very effectively during his time in the UPA, and used his knowledge of the terrain to become an exceptional enemy against Soviet and Polish authorities.     

The vanguard's dilemma: understanding and exploiting insurgent strategies

The purpose of this paper is to provide a better conceptualization of insurgent strategies. Specifically, I shall examine Che Guevara's ‘Foco’ theory of insurgency, as it is one of the most theoretically popular and most pervasive strategies of insurgency currently practiced throughout the world. After briefly examining the origins, objectives, and theoretical strengths of the Foco theory (also known as the Vanguard Theory), I will argue that Guevara's theory suffers from an internal tension that I term the ‘Vanguard's Dilemma’. The significance of this dilemma creates a tension within the Vanguard Theory that can be fatal for insurgents if properly exploited by counterinsurgent operations. This paper will examine in detail this dilemma and show how it can be exploited. Given that several insurgent groups within Iraq and Afghanistan currently adhere to the Vanguard Theory of insurgency, a proper understanding of this insurgent strategy is an essential first step in the long road towards confronting and winning asymmetrical conflicts.     

The strategic utility of New Zealand Special Forces

In 1955, the New Zealand government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British forces in Malaya to counter a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Drawing upon the operational experiences of the New Zealand SAS largely taken from the Cold War period, and underpinned by Colin Gray's Special Forces essentials of ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’, this article will show how New Zealand's SAS is now accepted not only as a respected and relevant part of the nation's military capability, but also empowers its political decision-makers with the confidence to take on significant, and at times difficult, strategic foreign-policy choices.