Measuring Military Professionalism in Partner Nations: Guidance for Security Assistance Officials

The U.S. spends billions of dollars in its security cooperation program to develop “professional, accountable, and capable security forces” in other nations, part of a grand strategy to improve global stability and counter violent extremism. Despite its great investment in professionalizing foreign militaries, however, the U.S. has no functional definition of military professionalism – a term that until now has been considered too vague and multi-faceted to operationalize. In this article, the author seeks to remedy this oversight, drawing from twenty years of security cooperation fieldwork in Latin America and Africa, as well as a vigorous literature review, to define four important components of military professionalism: (1) formal military education and vocational training, (2) military subordination to elected civilian officials, (3) knowledge and practice of the law of armed conflict and human rights law, and (4) a clearly established program of professional military ethics. This article provides guidelines for U.S. and European officials who work with partner nations to develop more professional military forces and, in particular, for officials managing security assistance programs with developing countries.     

“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

基于竞赛图的海上编队协同作战冲突排序方法

海上编队协同作战中的冲突消解顺序问题能影响编队作战效能。为了确定冲突消解的顺序问题,采用基于综合集成权重的竞赛图方法来表示多种冲突的有序关系,定量化给出了各冲突严重程度的排序结论,不仅为指挥员的决策提供了依据,而且提出了一种有序替代具体数值的定量化分析方法。结果证明,该方法简单、有效。     

作战系统指控协同效能的影响因素分析

作战系统日益复杂化和网络化,使得作战系统指控协同成为世界各国研究的热点问题。在对作战系统指控协同特点和影响要素分析的基础之上,从指控的信息质量、协同主体决策能力、协同时间、协同结构4个方面对协同效能的影响进行了分析,得出了一些结论。这些结论将对作战系统指控协同提供积极的理论启示和参考价值。     

边防毒品案件侦查协作机制研究

边境地区是我国毒品案件最为集中的地区,公安边防部门作为毒品案件的主要侦查机关,要提高侦办毒品案件的效率,话须依靠侦查协作。当前,我国边防毒品案件的侦查协作机制已经初步形成。与此同时,该协作机制也存在着不少问题与不足。对这些问题与不足进行探讨,并加以改进是十分必要的。     

基于网络的指挥控制协同性能评估模型

网络中心作战是通过部队网络化而实现的军事行动,网络化作战行动的评估需要新的模型和测量方法,以便获取基于信息优势对改进后的指挥和控制的效果.在借鉴美军经验的基础上,从信息的角度区分了网络中心作战信息栅格运作的方式,运用图论、复杂性理论和性能评估理论等方法,建立了作为信息处理系统的指挥控制网络的结构、预期延迟时间、协同影响、复杂性和有效期望等待时间模型,以及作为指挥控制系统的指挥控制网络的节点决策和网络决策效能模型,是对网络中心作战方法的探索.     

基于多Agent的网络化舰空导弹系统协同机制研究

针对舰艇编队反导防御作战的复杂性,采用网络中心战的作战概念,分析了网络化的舰空导弹系统作战资源共享的优势.以集成火控系统(Integrated Fire Control System)的构建原理为例,描述了网络化舰空导弹系统的网格结构和特点,基于多Agent协同原理,提出了网络化的舰空导弹系统两层"混合式"协同体系结构,并对该结构的协同机制进行了研究.     

潜射巡航导弹现在点攻击捕获概率计算

由于潜艇探测设备所获得的目标方位和距离信息存在误差,造成目标初始位置在一定的区域内存在散布情况,分析了潜射导弹在攻击水面舰艇时目标的散布情况,给出了目标散布区域的表示方法,根据巡航导弹搜捕目标的原理,给出导弹捕获散布目标的概率计算模型,并进一步探讨导弹齐射对散布目标的捕获情况,可为海战中导弹攻击方式的选择和导弹优化使用提供辅助决策.     

舰机协同海上搜寻关键问题研究?

直升机应用于海上搜救可以大大提高搜救速度和成功率。针对水面舰船和直升机的使用特点,分析了在海上搜救中实施舰机协同的必要性,研究了直升机在水面舰船协同下实施海上搜寻的搜寻方式,建立了直升机与舰船协同机动的数学模型,对实际的海上搜寻工作具有较高的实用价值。     

US–China military relations: competition and cooperation

ABSTRACT

China’s efforts to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ and a ‘new type of military-to-military relations’ do not constitute a major turning point in relations with the United States. Political relations set limits on military cooperation, and the two sides have been unable to construct a sustainable strategic basis for relations. This has contributed to an ‘on-again, off-again’ pattern in military ties. Trends show a pattern of frequent disruptions in military-to-military relations from 2000 to 2010, followed by an increase in interactions beginning in 2012. Nevertheless, obstacles on both sides are likely to limit mutual trust and constrain future development of military-to-military relations.