集成平台空域辅助阵列共址干扰抑制技术

针对同时存在恶意干扰与非法窃听的通信环境,提出一种协作干扰(cooperative jamming, CJ)掩护的保密通信架构,收发信机之间采用跳频技术躲避恶意干扰,并采用协作干扰技术阻塞非法窃听。但该架构的通信带宽较大,会在收发频率振荡器中引起显著的同相和正交(in-phase and quadrature, IQ)通道失衡。鉴于此,对收发IQ通道失衡引起的信号失真进行数学建模,给出接收机处信干噪比的数学表达式,并给出干扰抑制比的闭合表达式。仿真结果表明,收发IQ通道失衡引起的信号失真的功率远大于热噪声功率。随着收发IQ通道失衡加剧,所提架构的信干噪比和干扰抑制比性能均会急剧下降,当幅度和相位失衡分别达到0.95和π/50时,信干噪比和干扰抑制比均损失了47 dB。     

潜艇上浮运动数值计算方法的研究与验证

预报潜艇上浮运动是探索研究潜艇上浮运动控制规律以及潜艇安全上浮的前提。就潜艇上浮运动的数值计算方法和计算流程进行了详细介绍,对数值计算方法中的湍流模型及离散格式等进行了优选。基于模型上浮试验结果,对数值计算的不确定度进行了分析且对数值计算结果进行了验证。证明了该数值计算的可靠性,并发现数值计算结果与试验结果很接近,验证了该数值计算方法的可行性,说明该数值计算方法和试验可为潜艇上浮运动的研究提供参考和借鉴。     

精确制导技术研究

精确制导技术在整个现代军事技术的发展中占据着十分重要的地位,是世界各国竞相发展的对象,但是迄今为止在国际上尚无统一的定义,也无统一的分类标准.首先给出了精确制导技术的基本概念,然后详细地介绍了精确制导技术的分类,并分析了它们各自的优缺点,最后对精确制导技术的发展趋势作了说明.     

舰载雷达中频信号仿真设计与实现

为满足舰载传感器或武器系统论证、设计、试验、评估、训练等全生命周期的应用,对新型舰载警戒探测与跟踪雷达中频信号模拟器的系统体系和组成进行了探讨,介绍了系统的功能和技术指标,重点研究了软件无线电在雷达中频信号模拟中的应用、雷达电磁环境和目标回波仿真等一些关键技术,包括目标航迹模拟、目标回波模拟、杂波信号模拟、雷达接收天线仿真、雷达天线方向图仿真等.采用软件无线电技术和软硬件相结合的方法较逼真地实现了海战场复杂电磁环境下雷达中频信号的模拟.     

利用最小二乘支持向量机求解潜艇内外磁场映射模型

为提高潜艇磁隐身能力,应对潜艇固定磁场进行实时监测,提出利用最小二乘支持向量机的潜艇内外磁场映射方法。结合内外映射法和最小二乘支持向量机原理,通过交叉验证优化模型参数,建立由内到外的潜艇磁场映射模型。以潜艇外部垂向固定磁场变化量为分析对象,仿真和实验结果均与标准值吻合良好。与径向基神经网络算法相比,该方法的泛化能力和推算精度有明显提高,且更符合工程实际,对闭环消磁技术的研究具有指导意义。     

美军作战试验与鉴定发展研究

当前,军队装备试验鉴定正由性能试验向作战试验、在役考核全领域拓展。在装备试验鉴定体系全面重塑的历史背景下,为适应军队装备试验鉴定发展新变化,探索装备试验鉴定新理论,推进装备试验鉴定自主创新发展,亟需开展装备试验鉴定技术研究。美军相对较早开展了装备试验与鉴定工作,在作战试验与鉴定工作方面已形成了较完善的法规制度体系和规范的操作流程,有较成熟的理论与方法成果可供借鉴。与此同时,美军作战试验与鉴定工作也面临许多新问题。本文剖析了美军作战试验与鉴定的内涵和管理模式,研究了2018和2019年美军作战试验与鉴定的重点技术领域,并进行了对比分析,以期掌握近期美军作战试验与鉴定工作的发展变化。     

新一代人工智能在国防科技领域发展探讨

新一代人工智能技术已经成为当前研究的重点和热点,并逐渐成为提升国防力量、军事能力和国家竞争力的有效途径。本文在总结人工智能概念的基础上,给出了新一代人工智能的定义和发展的重要意义,从掌握未来战争主动权、支撑军工装备研制生产模式转型和保障国防科技先进性三个方面梳理了国防科技领域发展新一代人工智能的必要性,并从基础技术支撑和国防特色应用两个方向提出了国防科技领域发展新一代人工智能涉及的基础软硬件、标准规范、智能装备/系统、辅助作战指挥、智能研发等重点内容,在此基础上给出了相关的发展建议。以上研究可为新一代人工智能技术在国防科技领域的研究、应用和发展提供参考。     

【将军论坛】科技创新思维的哲学基础、本质特征与实践要求分析

科学技术是核心战斗力,科技创新思维是开启科技创新的“金钥匙”。为实现科技兴军目标,必须高度重视对科技创新思维的研究。本文首先提出马克思主义哲学是指导科技创新思维的锐利思想武器,并从唯物论、辨证法及认识论三个方面进行了论证;其次提出科技创新思维的三个本质特征,即新颖性、全维度和多样性;最后从五个方面提出科技创新思维的实践要求,即深刻认识创新对象、紧贴创新目标要求、重视创新实践探索、建构积淀创新知识、忠于坚守创新追求。     

The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success

There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions targeting authoritarian regimes are less effective than those against democratic regimes. This line of research, however, assumes that autocratic regimes are monolithic and that they have similar capacities to resist foreign pressure. This study argues that the success rate of sanctions against dictatorships is contingent on institutional differences across different types of autocracies. I develop a theoretical model indicating that single-party and military regimes are less likely to concede to foreign pressure compared to democracies. This is because they effectively use various repressive tactics and positive inducements to endure the costs of the coercion. Sanctions against personalist regimes, on the other hand, are likely to be as effective as sanctions directed at democracies. Personalist regimes might be inclined to acquiesce to foreign pressure due to their lack of strong institutional capacity to weather the costs of the sanctions. Results from the selection-corrected models show that sanctions against military or single-party regimes are less likely to induce concessions relative to democratic target regimes. The findings also indicate that there is no significant difference in the success rate of sanctions against personalist regimes and democratic governments.