“Made in China”: an emerging brand in the global arms market

Possession of a brand is a sine qua non for economic success, not least because it connotes trust in delivering the value promised. Although Western arms exporters offer branded systems whose sales are influenced by price, there is a plethora of other economic variables, such as offset requirements and life-cycle support. Entrants to the international arms market will struggle without such arms “packages.” China’s entry, however, goes beyond the traditional economic paradigm. A four-stage historical model offers the backdrop for identifying the drivers that have forged its market entry into 55 countries worldwide. The strategy initially focused on sales of rudimentary military equipment for political purposes, but recently it has begun to commercialize exports, repositioning them from a low- to a high-tech sales trajectory. A Sino “brand” is thus emerging, reflecting both competitiveness and diplomatic considerations, especially non-interference in client state domestic affairs.     

Does Military Spending Nonlinearly Affect Economic Growth in South Africa?

Using annual data collected from 1988 to 2015, this study provides evidence of a non-linear relationship between military spending, economic growth and other growth determinants for the South African economy. The empirical study is based on estimates of a logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model and our empirical results point to an inverted U-shaped relationship between military spending and economic growth for the data. Furthermore, our empirical results suggest that the current levels of military spending, as a component of total government expenditure, are too high in the South African economy and need to be transferred towards more productive non-military expenditure in order to improve the performance of economic growth and other growth determinants.     

The evaluation of a possible future Sino-Japanese armed conflict through the application of the ACEI-model

There is relatively little formal modeling of the economic effects of armed conflicts even though they have substantial economic effects. We set forth a new model, namely the armed conflict economic impact model – ACEI-Model. The model looks at the economic effects of war in three different stages: (i) pre-conflict stage; (ii) armed conflict stage; and (iii) post-conflict stage. The model is based on economic desgrowth (-δ) and other new conceptual indicators. We evaluate an imaginary armed conflict between China and Japan by applying the ACEI-Model.     

Military Expenditure,Endogeneity and Economic Growth

Abstract

While not always a concern for the general economic growth literature, the debate over the effects of military spending on growth continues to develop, with no consensus, but a deepening understanding of the limitations of previous work. One important issue that has not been adequately dealt with is the endogeneity of military spending in the growth equation, mainly because of the difficulty of finding any variables that would make adequate instruments. This paper considers this issue, using an endogenous growth model estimated on a large sample of 109 non-high-income countries for the period 1998–2012. The empirical analysis is framed within an instrumental variable setting that exploits the increase in military spending that occurs when unrest in a country escalates to turmoil. The estimation results show that endogeneity arising from reverse causality is a crucial issue, with the instrumental variable estimates providing a larger significant negative effect of military spending on growth than OLS would. This result is found to be robust to different sources of heterogeneity and different time periods.     

Modelling international conflict under conditions of state level economic and political uncertainty

Formal models of international conflict have tended to concentrate on change across the security dimension, assuming that the state level economic and political dimensions are constant. However, the conclusion of the Cold War suggests that over the long run these dimensions are not constant; indeed, the development of economic power, state level limits on defence expenditures, structural impediments to economic change, and several other ‘constants’ clearly do have an endogenous role in international conflict. This paper suggests one strategy for their inclusion as a causal factor in conflict modelling.     

Defence expenditures and economic growth: The externality effect

In a series of articles published in the Fall 1990 issue of Defence Economics Alexander (1990), Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) and Huang and Mintz (1990) have all specified and empirically estimated defence‐growth models based on a neoclassical production function. We now isolate the externality component in our model, re‐estimate its coefficients using data on the U.S. economy 1952–88 and compare specifications and results with Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) and Alexander (1990).     

Country Survey I–Military Spending in India 1

After a brief survey of the Indian economy, we survey the supply and demand of military expenditures in India over the last four decades. The causes of military expenditures appear to include regional rivalries and protracted conflicts, but it has proven difficult to delineate these with empirical models. The effects of military spending in India on economic growth appear to be benign, despite much speculation to the contrary. However, the opportunity costs of defence spending are shown to be considerable. We conclude with speculation about the role of debt and debt servicing in retarding future economic growth in India. We also speculate about the potential for the creation of a war economy in India.     

浅议对军队经济责任审计结果的运用

经济责任审计结果,就是经济责任审计成果的一系列结论性文件。正确运用经济责任审计结果,对于预防权力腐败,加强军队廉政建设具有重要的现实意义。     

The one‐warehouse multiretailer problem with an order‐up‐to level inventory policy

We consider a two‐level system in which a warehouse manages the inventories of multiple retailers. Each retailer employs an order‐up‐to level inventory policy over T periods and faces an external demand which is dynamic and known. A retailer's inventory should be raised to its maximum limit when replenished. The problem is to jointly decide on replenishment times and quantities of warehouse and retailers so as to minimize the total costs in the system. Unlike the case in the single level lot‐sizing problem, we cannot assume that the initial inventory will be zero without loss of generality. We propose a strong mixed integer program formulation for the problem with zero and nonzero initial inventories at the warehouse. The strong formulation for the zero initial inventory case has only T binary variables and represents the convex hull of the feasible region of the problem when there is only one retailer. Computational results with a state‐of‐the art solver reveal that our formulations are very effective in solving large‐size instances to optimality. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

经济利益与行政控权

作为一种公共权力 ,行政权只能用于公共事业 ,只服务于公众利益 ,而不能有私利。在行政法学中遵循行政权力与经济利益相分离的原则 ,杜绝部门立法 ,完善公司法 ,清理行政性公司 ,建立公务员财产申报制度是控制行政权的良策