Dynamic lot‐sizing model with production time windows

We consider a dynamic lot‐sizing model with production time windows where each of n demands has earliest and latest production due dates and it must be satisfied during the given time window. For the case of nonspeculative cost structure, an O(nlogn) time procedure is developed and it is shown to run in O(n) when demands come in the order of latest production due dates. When the cost structure is somewhat general fixed plus linear that allows speculative motive, an optimal procedure with O(T⁴) is proposed where T is the length of a planning horizon. Finally, for the most general concave production cost structure, an optimal procedure with O(T⁵) is designed. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A drive to regime change through nonviolent economic warfare: The post-Mugabe era, 2017–2019

ABSTRACT

This article examines efforts made by the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance to bring about regime change through nonviolent economic warfare including its subsequent failure. The 30 July 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe led to a victory by Emmerson Mnangagwa but it was disputed by Nelson Chamisa. Since August 2018, the political opposition led by Chamisa sought to make the country ungovernable by waging a nonviolent economic war nicknamed Kuzvidira jecha (pouring sand) against the Mnangagwa administration. This was punctuated by price hikes, fluctuation of the local currency, artificial food stuff price hikes and fuel shortages which caused serious challenges for most Zimbabweans. This was primarily intended to bring about regime change via public unrest against the Mnangagwa regime. On the contrary, the anticipated public uproar failed to foster regime change in Zimbabwe despite widespread adverse socio-economic effects. This led to the nonviolent participants resorting to violent tactics instead of adhering to nonviolence. Consequently, it was the failure to adhere to nonviolent principles by opposition advocates which forced the Mnangagwa regime to deploy its own instruments of violence in an effort to protect lives and property.     

Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.