重力势能锁止型外骨骼设计及其效能评价

现存的被动式外骨骼存在助力效果不明显等缺陷。基于人体步态特征,提出了将人体行走过程中的重力势能转化为人体抬腿过程中动能的原理,通过弹簧、曲柄滑块机构、棘轮棘爪机构以及链传动机构的组合,设计了一款被动式下肢机械外骨骼,并通过外骨骼动力学分析和生理消耗指数实验测试的方法进行了外骨骼性能评价。动力学分析结果表明,穿戴外骨骼后髋关节峰力矩总量降低了23.43%,髋关节做功总量降低了30.59%,初步验证了外骨骼的有效性。生理消耗指数实验测试结果表明, 穿戴外骨骼对于短距离动作转换未产生显著效果,但在长距离行走和上坡行走中分别降低了8.1%和10.4%的能量消耗。因此,该下肢外骨骼助力性能得到了验证,为相关领域的研究提供了实例化参考。     

Survey and technological analysis of laser and its defense applications

The laser technology has made remarkable progress over the past couple of decades.It is being widely employed in diverse domains,such as holography,space sciences,spectroscopy,medical sciences,micro and power electronics,industrial engineering,and most distinctively,as directed energy military weapons.Owing to their active transmissions,laser systems are similar to microwave radars to some extent;however,unlike conventional radars,the laser operates at very high frequencies thus making it a potent enabler of narrow-beam and high energy aerial deployments,both in offensive and defensive roles.In modern avionics systems,laser target indicators and beam riders are the most common devices that are used to direct the Laser Guided Weapons(LGW)accurately to the ground targets.Additionally,compact size and outstanding angular resolution of laser-based systems motivate their use for drones and unmanned aerial applications.Moreover,the narrow-beam divergence of laser emissions offers a low probability of intercept,making it a suitable contender for secure transmissions and safety-critical operations.Furthermore,the developments in space sciences and laser technology have given syner-gistic potential outcomes to use laser systems in space operations.This paper comprehensively reviews laser applications and projects for strategic defense actions on the ground or in space.Additionally,a detailed analysis has been done on recent advancements of the laser technology for target indicators and range-finders.It also reviews the advancements in the field of laser communications for surveillance,its earlier state of the art,and ongoing scientific research and ad-vancements in the domain of high energy directed laser weapons that have revolutionized the evolving military battlefield.Besides offering a comprehensive taxonomy,the paper also critically analyzes some of the recent contributions in the associated domains.     

航天装备大数据资源平台构建技术研究

航天装备研制涉及论证、研制、生产、试验、综合保障等各个环节,所产生的数据具有种类多、数据量大、异构性强等特点,且数据资源分散于各科研机构院所,形成一个个数据孤岛,严重制约了型号数据的统一管理和协同应用。为了建立“逻辑统一、物理分散”的航天装备统一大数据中心,本文提出一种航天装备大数据资源平台构建技术,该平台基于统一的数据编目规范,综合利用云计算、微服务、区块链等技术,可实现多维异构数据深度融合管控,实现基于型号科研生产活动下的数据逻辑统一管理和实体分布式存储,能够解决航天装备整个研制活动全要素全过程的数据采集和可控共享的现实需求,为各业务场景下的数据分析奠定基础。     

新经济环境下内部审计风险形成的主客观因素及防范

本文从客观和主观两个方面分析社会主义市场经济条件下,内部审计风险形成的原因,并尝试提出了相应的防范措施,即增强内部审计人员的风险意识、提高内部审计队伍的整体素质、采用内部审计的科学方法、加强内部审计的机构管理和完善内部审计的监控制度。     

NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship,Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterised by chaos and insecurity for a number of years, but the rise of the M23 rebellion in 2012 once again highlighted just how dire the humanitarian and security situation is. For most of 2012, the crisis was addressed through negotiations between M23 and Kinshasa, mediated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). However, 2013 marked the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement (PSC Framework), and the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2098, which contains the mandate of the long-awaited Intervention Brigade (IB). The PSC Framework calls on Kinshasa to implement substantial political reforms while also urging the neighbours of the DRC to stop interfering in its internal affairs. The IB is mandated to carry out targeted operations against the so-called ‘negative forces’ that operate in the eastern DRC. For now, hope of resolving this ongoing crisis hinges on the continuing ICGLR negotiations, the implementation of the PSC Framework and the success of the IB. However, there are critical questions about all of these processes that need to be answered and understood, as the expectations for these processes – especially in the case of the IB – are extremely high. Will the ICGLR manage to negotiate a peace agreement and will the IB succeed, or will they go down in history as yet another failure to save the eastern DRC?     

ACQUIRING FOREIGN NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region.     

TURKEY'S NUCLEAR COMEBACK

As worries have grown about global warming and the sustainability and price of fossil fuels, the demand for nuclear energy has increased, and nuclear power is increasingly viewed as a reliable and clean resource. However, the so-called nuclear renaissance coincides with an international security environment in which the norms of nuclear nonproliferation seem to be eroding. Turkey, a non-nuclear weapon state, plans to generate nuclear power to meet future energy demands, but it is aware of and concerned with regional proliferation trends. Questions have also been raised regarding Ankara's rationale for using nuclear energy, as well as its potential motivations and capabilities regarding future proliferation. This article will provide an overview of Turkey's nuclear energy history and plans, as well as the proliferation-related questions that could arise; it will also look at the domestic debate on nuclear energy and Turkey's status as a non-nuclear weapon state.     

Deferred verification: verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament.