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381.
This article analyzes the causes of combat effectiveness of the South Korean security forces through the course of its various counter-insurgency (COIN) operations from 1948 to 1953. We argue that improvements in two interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher operational and tactical level performance: unified operational command structure and the subsequent improvements in tactical efficiency under the guidance of the US advisory mission. Through an in-depth case study on how a nascent army improved its capacity in combating homegrown insurgencies, we demonstrate how the actual conduct of operations itself remains just as significant in the assessment of overall COIN outcomes.  相似文献   
382.
After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.  相似文献   
383.
How do we understand combat effectiveness – soldiers’ performance in battle? Despite the broad consensus that understanding combat effectiveness is important both for scholars and policymakers, there is widespread disagreement about what combat effectiveness is. More specifically, studies of effectiveness tend to focus on either the skill of soldiers in battle, or their will to fight. Yet both skill and will are essential components of an effective fighting force. This article argues that understanding combat effectiveness requires understanding both of these key components of effectiveness. In other words, combat effectiveness requires both the skill and will to engage the enemy in an organized manner. It then demonstrates the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of British, Indian, and Australian forces fighting the Japanese during the Second World War. Only when scholars are talking about the same concept will our understanding of the conditions under which militaries are effective in battle progress. By comparing different units fighting the same opponent under the same material conditions, I demonstrate that units vary both in their combat skill and their will to fight, and that understanding their effectiveness in battle requires analyzing both of these key factors.  相似文献   
384.
ABSTRACT

Since the early 2000s, the “local turn” has thoroughly transformed the field of peacebuilding. The European Union (EU) policy discourse on peacebuilding has also aligned with this trend, with an increasing number of EU policy statements insisting on the importance of “the local.” However, most studies on EU peacebuilding still adopt a top-down approach and focus on institutions, capabilities, and decision-making at the EU level. This special issue contributes to the literature by focusing on bottom-up and local dynamics of EU peacebuilding. After outlining the rationale and the scope of the special issue, this article discusses the local turn in international peacebuilding and identifies several interrelated concepts relevant to theorizing the role of the local, specifically those of effectiveness, ownership, and resistance. In the conclusion, we summarize the key contributions of this special issue and suggest some avenues for further research.  相似文献   
385.
反恐分队作战效能的灰色聚类方法评估   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
评估反恐分队作战效能对加强反恐部队建设、提高反恐能力有一定的指导意义.本文根据影响反恐作战的主要因素,建立了比较全面的评价指标体系.运用层次分析的方法确定各指标的权重系数.采用灰色聚类的评价方法将子效能聚合成反恐作战的体系效能.其中要素包括样本矩阵、灰类、白化权函数.由此实现反恐分队作战效能的量化评估.最后通过实例分析和计算,证明评价模型的合理、有效、可行.  相似文献   
386.
提升《思想道德修养与法律基础》课的教学效果,应注重从三个环节入手。一是把握备课环节,实现教学的统一性;二是注重反馈环节,增强教学的主动性;三是强化实践环节,增强学生的自觉性。  相似文献   
387.
战时装备维修保障效能及评估指标体系研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
分析了装备维修保障效能的定义、与维修保障能力的区别以及度量方法;在此基础上,依据装备维修保障效能评估指标体系的构建思路和构建原则,建立了战时装备维修保障效能评估指标体系。该指标体系是基于任务的动态指标,能够反映战时装备维修保障效能,可操作性强,可以为战时装备维修保障系统的仿真评估提供可靠依据。  相似文献   
388.
多媒体技术在《热学》课程教学中的应用分析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
本文阐述了在热学教学中应用多媒体技术的必要性,分析了多媒体教学的优势和在热学教学中容易带来的问题,探索了更好地发挥多媒体教学作用的方法。  相似文献   
389.
针对C4ISR系统效能评估过程中指标聚合计算不合理的问题,提出了一种新的指标聚合计算方法,即惩罚函数法。分析了C4ISR系统效能评估方法的现状,以及常用的指标聚合方法;给出了C4ISR系统效能指标体系和指标度量方法;描述了惩罚函数的思想以及3种不同的函数形式;通过一个C4ISR系统效能评估算例,对3种惩罚函数的计算结果进行了对比分析,并给出了函数选择的建议。  相似文献   
390.
基于AHP和云重心方法的装甲兵指挥信息系统效能评估   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
陈利  尤峰 《指挥控制与仿真》2008,30(4):59-60,64
针对装甲机械化部队指挥信息系统作战效能评估问题,运用云理论进行了探索。首先,对云重心理论的步骤进行了阐述,结合层次分析法,最后用加权偏离度来衡量系统与理想状态的偏离度,将结果用Matlab三维图形对装甲机械化部队指挥信息系统的作战效能进行描述,图形较直观的反应了其效能问题。此方法简单易行,可操作性强,为装甲机械化部队指挥信息系统评估提供了一种较好的途径。  相似文献   
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