次级通道估计误差对Fx-Newton算法的影响

Fx-Newton算法在执行过程中需要估计次级通道模型,针对主被动隔振工程应用中次级通道估计存在误差的问题,假设输入信号为正弦信号,建立含次级通道估计误差的Fx-Newton算法结构模型,推导了Fx-Newton算法的稳定性条件,并就相位误差和幅值误差对Fx-Newton算法稳定性和收敛性的影响做了详细阐述。最后对两自由度主被动隔振模型开展仿真研究,验证了理论分析结果。     

面向作战任务的最小风险传感器调度方法

基于风险理论提出一种面向不同目标探测任务的传感器调度方法。将主动传感器辐射被截获风险和目标探测风险结合起来,建立一般目标探测框架下的传感器最小风险调度模型。分目标跟踪、目标识别和目标威胁等级评估三种情况将传感器最小风险调度模型具体化,给出不同情况下目标探测风险值的计算方法。针对模型的求解提出一种基于混沌思想、反向学习和双向轮盘赌的改进人工蜂群算法。通过仿真实验证明了模型的可行性和算法的有效性。     

脉冲功率电源故障诊断方法研究

脉冲功率电源是电磁发射系统中最容易发生故障的薄弱环节,脉冲功率电源故障会使整个系统性能下降。针对脉冲功率电源故障,提出基于多层小波分析提取故障信息的模式搜索支持向量机故障诊断方法。通过建立脉冲功率电源的软故障模型,进行仿真分析获得电流故障数据样本,对故障样本进行离散小波分解,获得指定层细节信息的小波系数作为故障特征量;对故障特征量进行主成分分析,将小波系数进行降维,以便有效地进行故障诊断。通过实验,将所提方法故障诊断结果与其他三种故障诊断结果进行比较,验证了所提方法的有效性。     

智能时代的军事训练变革

随着智能技术的发展,人类已逐步迈入智能时代,而智能时代催生了军事训练变革。本文从智能技术影响军事训练典型领域的角度,分析了智能时代背景下,以大数据和人工智能为核心的智能技术,如何影响军事训练的理念、内容、方式及管理,并催生了这些领域的变革。研究表明,智能时代发展背景下,军事训练理念将更加先进,训练内容更加融合,训练方式更加有效,训练管理更加精准。     

The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Buy now,pay later: American military intervention and the strategic cost paradox

This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.     

On the roles of free play in army exercises and the Russians

The article outlines the essential role of free play elements in various types of exercises for the development of in-depth and practical military professionalism. It thereafter argues why such use of free play contradicts the military science founded Russian Way of War.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Regular and irregular forces in conflict: nineteenth century insurgencies in South America

ABSTRACT

In the decades following independence from Spain, ‘civil wars’ ravaged the newly established polities in South America. Former vice-regal capitals inherited a larger portion of the colonial administration and had larger economic resources and a hegemonic project they were able to have permanent and professional armed forces, capable of leading the offensive and giving battle following the European rules of military art. The central hypothesis of this work is that there is a necessary relationship between the shape of these asymmetrical conflicts, their outcome and the political territorial configuration of each country in post-revolutionary Spanish America. When permanent armies took over from local militias, the capital kept the integrity of its territories and there was a tendency towards political centralization. When this did not happen and the militias managed to find a way to defeat their centralizing enemies, the local powers had an opportunity to renegotiate their participation in the political body, and sought to maintain their independence, which was manifest in federal agreements, otherwise a process of territorial fragmentation began. More than a difference between regular and irregular forces there was one between intermittent, and permanent mobilization.