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161.
美国的弹道导弹防御新策略 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:3
由美国国会1999 年3 月决定加速发展“最具前途”的高层战区 导弹防御系统, 所以有关美国弹道导弹防御的新策略近期成了全球讨论的热点。文章从描述 美国战区导弹防御系统和国家导弹防御系统的基本配置和拦截试验出发, 简要介绍了美国的 弹道导弹防御计划。最后指出, 弹道导弹防御的核心思想是以数量庞大的精确制导武器摧毁来袭弹道导弹, 在战略导弹防御的三个阶段实施反导作战。 相似文献
162.
周守本 《国防科技大学学报》1988,10(2):81-88
巨型计算机的前端工作站是巨型计算机系统的重要组成部分,它实现了主处理机与前端处理机的互联。文章从功能与结构两个方面阐述了前端工作站的设计,并且简要地介绍了通讯协议。前端工作站已研制成功并正式投入了使用。 相似文献
163.
164.
战略防御是试图消除来自核弹道导弹的威胁.根据目前的软件技术和战略防御系统的特点,我们认为,其软件不可能达到预期目标. 相似文献
165.
甘楚雄 《国防科技大学学报》1989,11(3):16-25
织女一号气象火箭是一种小型无控固体火箭,由于采用了若干先进的技术,使其总体性能达到了国际先进水平。本文介绍了其总体性能,重点介绍了总体方案设计中采用的包括最优推力程序等若干先进技术。 相似文献
166.
在分析野战防空作战系统特点的基础上,讨论该系统的仿真策略,提出了主动实体交替扫描的仿真策略,并给出了非形式化的描述。该方法体现了事件调度法和活动扫描法的优点,使之更适合于仿真带有对抗性离散事件系统,因此,对其它作战系统,尤其是战术C~3I 系统的仿真,也是适用的。 相似文献
167.
陆军防空兵自动化指挥系统已作为防空作战效能“倍增器”列入国家军装武器发展规划,并在近期可能交付防空部队使用。这一新装备、新技术的出现和发展必然会引起防空作战指挥的变化。在分析防空兵指挥自动化对防空作战指挥影响的基础上,对如何发挥防空兵自动化指挥的防空作战效能和防空兵指挥自动化需迫切解决的一些问题加以探讨。 相似文献
168.
ABSTRACTThe practice of dispatching teams of police advisors to other states to build or train foreign security forces began at the end of the nineteenth century, yet there exists no definitive history of the practice, or any definitive theoretical approach underpinning why such missions succeed or fail. Drawing upon their recent edited book on expeditionary police advising, and by examining the donor or sending states, the host nations, and the use of police in counterinsurgency situations, the authors present some key reasons why such missions fail, and lay some groundwork for additional study of this important subject. 相似文献
169.
Thomas-Durell Young 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(7):1031-1057
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions. 相似文献
170.
Joshua H. Pollack 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):155-164
ABSTRACTThe United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers. 相似文献