海军舰艇编队防空导弹协同作战技术研究

主要以信息化条件下如何提升海军舰艇编队防空导弹作战能力为背景,重点描述协同指挥和协同制导作战的概念内涵、国内外研究现状、作战模式、主要实现的功能,给出不同指挥层次下各指挥节点的体系结构和功能定位,进而从信息场和功能界面等方面说明协同指挥和协同制导2个功能层次的区别.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS

This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years.     

Remaking the military industrial relationship: A French‐American comparison

Defense industrial complexes in leading Cold War nations have downsized and reallocated resources to other productive activities in the 1990s. In this paper, we analyze the experience of two key countries ‐ the US and France. Comparing the two countries, we find similar outcomes in budgetary retrenchment and large firm restructuring but marked differences in the pace of downsizing and diversification among small and medium‐sized firms. We hypothesize that three sets of contextual differences may explain these differences: 1) institutional differences in the way that the State bureaucracies ‐ the Pentagon and the French Délégation générale pour l'armement (DGA) ‐ oversee defense industrial matters, 2) differences in military industry ownership and firm size patterns, and 3) differences in the regional distribution of defense industrial capacity and associated regional policies. In closing, we note that the two countries’ defense industrial complexes are becoming more alike and speculate on the significance of invidious competition and interactions between them. We address briefly the future of French/American arms industrial competition and cooperation, given the trend towards transnational security arrangements and defense industry globalization     

Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Abstract

Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, money, and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU member states have carried disproportionate shares of the burden of CSDP operations is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. We address this gap by analyzing determinants of contribution levels to CSDP operations. In employing an innovative multi-method design that combines insights from collection action theory with those from integrated theories of military burden sharing, our results indicate that EU countries tend to contribute in positive disproportion with their capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. In contrast, they undercontribute when small trade volumes with the area of operations combine with a weak peacekeeping tradition.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

The Finger on the Button

Taiwan's international status is such that the country's ability to trade and to supply certain goods and technologies remains its primary means of practicing diplomacy and asserting international influence. U.S. pressure to conform to international nonproliferation standards has made the issue of export controls a troubling one for Taiwan. Limiting Taiwan's economic relations affects its ability to sustain itself economically and to maintain productive relations with other nations. On the other hand, as a recipient of U.S. high-technology transfers and security assurances, Taiwan cannot ignore the directives of the United States. The article focuses on this dilemma and how a shift in power to the Democratic Progressive Party is affecting Taiwan's choice between placing limitations on its global economic power or risking being cut off from U.S. technology and losing U.S. security assurances. In order to address this challenge properly, Taiwan will need to reassess its fundamental economic and security interests.     

Aligning national “logics” in a European military helicopter program

This article analyzes the public side of the NH90 network consisting of four participating countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) and their industrial partners. Comparable to observations in earlier international projects in the defense sector, the development and production of the NH90 defense helicopter did not match original plans and costs estimates. On the basis of four mechanisms that were intended to facilitate the cooperation between the partnering countries (the General Memorandum of Understanding; coalition formation; the role of the central agency; and the process of vertical escalation) the question is posed whether or not there was a true alignment of national interests and “logics.” The lack of standardization, as well as program delays and issues concerning the division of the work-share, lead to the emerging alignment being characterized as “quasi-alignment” at best.     

加强网络国防建设战略运筹需要强化的六种意识

针对网络国防的现实需求,文章就加强网络国防建设的战略运筹指出了需要强化的六种意识：忧患意识,全局意识,创新意识,主动意识,重点意识,优势意识。在分析了三个方面的忧患意识,归纳了服务于国家安全战略、加强全局筹划、强化长远效益的全局意识。总结了理论创新、法律创新、技术创新为主要领域的创新意识等基础上,提出了维护国家根本利益、聚力局部竞争优势、拓展综合防卫能力的重点意识,探讨了主动探索建设途径、主动加强机制建设、主动构建核心能力的主动意识．分析了尽快形成战斗力生成模式优势、尽快形成防御力量和人才优势、尽快形成军民融合发展体系的优势意识。     

基于Ansofl的PMLS发电机纵向边端效应仿真

永磁直线同步发电机特殊的结构使其存在一种特殊现象——纵向边端效应,从而严重影响了永磁直线同步发电机的性能。利用有限元电磁场分析软件Ansoft建立了永磁直线同步发电机的二维模型,分析了纵向边端效应产生的原因,以及纵向边端效应对永磁直线同步发电机初级磁场的影响。利用磁阻相等的原理,通过增加发电机端部齿宽度和极数两种方法来改善永磁直线发电机性能。经Ansoft软件仿真,结果表明增加端部齿宽度和极数可以有效抑制纵向边端效应,提高永磁直线同步发电机的性能。