再入机动弹头滚动回路鲁棒姿态控制系统设计

根据经典控制理论,引入姿态角加速度反馈,采用零、极点相消,变增益补偿等设计方法,所设计的再入机动弹头滚动回路姿态控制系统具有良好的快速性、稳定性和很强的鲁棒性。     

一种基于双基点复合物元法的装备维修保障系统评估方法

结合 TOPSIS 方法中双基点的概念,提出了一种基于双基点的复合物元评估方法.在对装备维修保障系统进行综合评价时,将几类保障系统作为物元事物,在确定理想物元和负理想物元的基础上,采用专家经验和熵权法相结合的方法确定各评价指标的权重系数,通过计算相对于双基点的关联度对评价对象进行排序.理论研究和实例分析表明,该方法便于扩展、易于计算机实现、推广性强,而且指标权系数采用主客观相结合的方法确定,更具有合理性.     

涡轮增压机组的功率平衡计算方法

介绍了舰船蒸汽动力装置中增压锅炉的计算特性,并在对已有的一些相关计算模型分析的基础上,描述了涡轮增压机组的功率平衡计算难题。针对该难题给出了涡轮增压机组的功率平衡计算流程和计算中有关问题的处理方法,在确保计算完备可行的前提下,该方法适合于工程应用。     

谈新时期发扬艰苦奋斗精神

艰苦奋斗精神在全面建设小康社会的新阶段有着丰富的科学内涵。新时期发扬艰苦奋斗精神有着重要的时代意义。当前 ,发扬艰苦奋斗精神必须着力解决好理想信念、创新理念、群众观点、节俭意识、领导带头五个问题。     

信息化条件下基于大数据的后装一体化保障构想

由于契约的不完全性、专用性资产的存在,导致民企参军的谈判过程中,一方可能利用另一方因专用性资产投资的锁定效应,而采取机会主义行为将另一方套牢,攫取可占用专用性准租金。这种套牢风险不是单向的,而是双向的,双向套牢风险的存在不仅会降低军品科研生产项目建设质量,而且还会严重挫伤民营企业承担军品科研生产任务的积极性。为有效防范双向套牢风险,本文将从博弈论的角度,建立民营企业与军队采办部门的期望收益与专用性资产投资的函数关系和博弈矩阵,分阶段讨论民营企业与军队采办部门所面临的套牢风险大小及各自的最佳行为选择。以降低民企参军面临的套牢风险,引导更多优势民营企业进入军品科研生产与维修领域,推动军民融合的深度发展。     

对一起烟头引起阴燃火灾的调查及思考

通过对一起影响和损失较大的通讯部门火灾的现场勘验,系统分析了火灾现场勘验的火势蔓延勘查思路,通过对阴燃的形成条件及规律的分析,运用起火点处排除法,准确认定了火灾原因,并由此次火灾的调查引起一系列的思考。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

Recent scholarship in security studies has started to explore the causes and consequences of various forms of national restrictions in multinational military operations (MMOs). This article makes a conceptual contribution to this literature by developing a theoretical framework of national restrictions in MMOs that distinguishes between structural, procedural, and operational restrictions. I argue that these types of restrictions are governed by different causal mechanisms. Structural restrictions are relatively stable over time and effect deployment decisions irrespective of other factors. Procedural restrictions, on the other hand, can constitute veto points against deployment only in combination with distinct political preferences. Finally, operational restrictions directly affect the rules of engagement of troop contributing countries. The article illustrates the three types of restrictions and their interaction with empirical examples from a range of countries and sketches their impact on MMO deployment decisions and mandates.     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

一般民用建筑火灾特点与起火部位认定

从建筑火灾特点出发,阐述了建筑火灾发展阶段的蔓延特点、烟气流动特性与起火部位的内在联系,说明这些建筑火灾特点对起火部位的认定作用。