新形势下以需求为导向的装备保障能力建设

分析了军事智能技术的由来与发展现状,探讨了目前世界军事智能技术的应用领域。重点阐述军事智能技术对中国军事实力提高的重要意义、如何加快军事智能技术发展的几个问题,为中国军队未来智能化发展和应用提出建设性的思考。     

CPN在海上防空建模中的应用

着色 Petri网 (CP-网或 CPN )是一种面向图形的语言 ,用来设计、说明、模拟和验证系统。尤其适用于通信系统等同步和资源共享占有重要地位的系统。在通信协议、分步式系统、嵌入系统、自动生产系统、工作流分析、VL SI芯片等方面都有典型的应用。本文简单介绍了 CPN的发展过程和基本原理 ,重点就 CPN在海上防空系统建模仿真中的应用进行了探讨     

基于CA的雷达情报传输安全认证系统的设计与实现*

介绍了基于CA的雷达情报传输安全认证系统的整体结构及工作流程,设计了CA中心各个模块的组成和功能;使用VisualC 6.0开发工具与OpenSSL-0.9.8e开源包,实现了一个原型系统,研究了生成根钥证书,用户证书、证书吊销列表的方法和流程,为所有通信实体提供了密钥长度2048bit并遵从X.509v3标准的RSA数字证书;利用AES算法加密用户证书,结合SQLServer数据库,保证了证书的安全存储;最后探讨了USBKey智能钥匙在证书分发中的应用思路。     

公安边防情报人员的元认知分析

从认知心理角度分析,公安边防情报分析过程是边防情报分析人员头脑内信息加工系统的工作过程,在这一过程中存在元认知,元认知在信息加工系统中处于支配地位,能控制调节各种信息加工活动,并能促进边防情报分析人员思维的创新。研究边防情报分析人员的元认知有助于提高边防情报分析质量。分析了边防情报分析人员元认知的几个方面,提出了提高边防情报分析人员元认知能力及措施。     

美军无人机蜂群作战研究动态及应对策略

无人机蜂群是以智能化无人控制技术和网络信息系统为支撑的集群式无人作战武器装备,这种新型武器装备势必将成为改变未来战争规则的重要推手.美军作为无人机蜂群作战研究的领跑者,掌握了解其发展动态,学习其相关有益经验做法,参考借鉴其理论体系和关键技术,对于军队打赢未来智能化战争具有重要现实意义.本文通过梳理与总结美军在无人机蜂群...     

扩展信念网络模型的军事情报检索系统设计

着眼信息化战争条件下军事情报分类、处理困难的现实,在深入分析军事情报检索系统特点基础上,提出一个基于分类的自动存储和利用查询术语同义词关系扩展信念模型的检索军事情报检索原型系统,详细描述了其存储和检索设计思路.     

首都周边维稳预警机制研究

在构建首都大周边维稳预警机制中,情报工作具有监测、预测和辅助决策功能。社情监测离不开情报的收集,维稳社情预测依赖于情报的分析、研判、传递与通报,危害社会安全稳定案件预控离不开情报支撑。做好首都周边地区维稳预警工作,需要健全和完善情报收集制度、情报分析和研判制度、情报送报制度、相关情报工作制度以及社会舆情信息汇集与分析制度。     

日本预防街头犯罪对策与启示

在剖析解读日本街头犯罪＂预防对策＂的基础上,提出日本警察运用简单手段取得社会治安的理想效果。预防犯罪,在理念上把警方全包全责调整向组织牵头、协调联动和指导督促;在实践上完善警察牵头,以警察、政府相关部门、生产相关企业、新闻媒体和普通民众等广泛参与为基础的联动群防机制;在落实上不断加强高技术手段与原始方法相互补充的立体防范环境建设;在过程中尽量贴近现实需要,以完整的系统来控制街头犯罪,是降低预防犯罪成本、提高预防犯罪效率的捷径之一。     

Disregarding the Bear: How US Intelligence Failed to Estimate the Soviet Intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition 1

This article analyzes the main factors that contributed to the failure of the US intelligence community to alert against Soviet intentions and the intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition in 1969–70. Based on fresh archival sources, this research describes the US intelligence conception concerning the USSR; explains the crystallization of the intelligence estimate on the probability of Soviet intervention in 1970; deals with the intelligence data that were acquired but eventually ignored; and concludes with several plausible explanations for the intelligence blunder.     

A reply to Larry cable

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.