目标的规避过程与搜索运动

应用随机过程的观点,研究了静态目标和动态目标的几种规避方式、运动规律和目标位置的概率分布,导出了在上述几种情况下对规避目标的最优（理论）搜索计划。     

目标选择优化模型及算法

提出了可用于大威力武器火力分配的目标选择优化模型及算法。内容包括：问题的数学描述、问题的等价变换与分解、问题求解的动态规划算法和不同算法的计算次数比较。     

角速率火控系统计算延迟问题的研究

提出解决角速率火控系统计算延迟问题的两种方法,为深入研究角速率火控计算进行了新的探索。     

搜索力最优配置的求解与收敛性分析

讨论了搜索线上搜索力（密度）的最优配置问题,给出了求解的算法。并对其收敛性作了证明。     

关于大型线性规划问题鞍点算法的讨论

关于大型线性规划问题鞍点算法的讨论尚毅,张国光,成孟金（沈阳化工学院１１００２１）ＡＤｉｓｃｕｓｓｉｏｎｏｆｔｈｅＳａｄｄｌｅＰｏｉｎｔＡｌｇｏｒｉｔｈｍｆｏｒＬａｒｇｅＳｃａｌｅＬＰＰｒｏｂｌｅｍｓ￥ＳｈａｎｇＹｉ;ＺｈａｎｇＧｕｏｇｕａｎｇ;Ｃｈ...     

求解整数规划问题的一个搜索方法

本文整数规划问题给出一种搜索方法,它类似于求解连续变量优化问题的迭代方法,从一个好的初始可行解出发,寻找一个搜索方向,沿着这个方向求出改进的可行解,然后又开始下一次迭代。此方法简单易行,可以求出问题的最优解或近似最优解,对于整数线性规划问题和整数非线性规划问题的求解都适用,并且容易推广到求解大规校整数线性规划问题。文中附有计算例子,说明方法是有效的。     

Smalltalk-80 的形式语义研究

Smalltalk-80是原型的面向对象程序设计语言和环境。本文简要地介绍了Smalltalk-80的基本概念和抽象文法,给出了其形式模型,并基于该模型描述了Smalltalk-80的静态指称语义和动态指称语义。     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

Global counterinsurgency and US army expansion: the case for recruiting foreign troops

Given the nature of global counterinsurgency operations, the demands of military expansion, and the need for cultural, linguistic, and regional expertise, the United States Army should evaluate the establishment of US-led foreign troop units for its evolving force structure. This article proposes the creation of an American foreign legion based upon the recruitment of US-led, ethnically homogeneous tribal force units to meet the grist mill of counterinsurgency operations. This structured approach would be more beneficial than the current reliance on a de facto American Foreign Legion, represented by private military contractors (PMCs), many of them comprised of foreigners. These PMCs carry a number of oversight, accountability, and legal risks not found in a fully integrated, and US-officered foreign legion. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, the South-West African Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (Koevoet), and the Kit Carson Scouts serve as relevant historical examples where foreign troops were used to supplement national manpower resources.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’