动态威胁环境下单无人机测向定位航迹优化算法

为解决单架无人机在动态战场环境下的测向定位问题,提出了一种基于动态窗口法的单机测向定位航迹优化算法.以最大化Fisher信息矩阵行列式为测向定位评价准则,在由动态探测雷达和静/动障碍构成的动态战场环境中,基于动态窗口法思想,将测向定位航迹优化评价准则由传统的单步最优原则扩展到对多步预测航迹的评价,同时考虑雷达探测和静/...     

结合非负张量表示与扩展隐Dirichlet分配模型的图像标注

由于"语义鸿沟"的存在,自动图像标注是一项极具挑战性的工作。考虑到图像低层视觉特征与高层语义概念的差异,分别从图像表示与语义建模两个方面来实现自动图像标注。在图像表示方面,提出了一种正则化约束下的非负张量表示方法,用以提取符合人眼视觉直观理解的图像高阶结构特征。在语义建模方面,提出了一种三层贝叶斯模型——扩展隐Dirichlet分配。该模型利用隐变量来实现图像与标注词的关联,并通过一种基于变分推理的期望最大值方法来估计参数。实验结果表明,ELDA模型在大规模数据库NUS-WIDE上的标注结果相较于现有方法有了显著的提高。     

永磁直线同步电机伺服系统自抗扰反步控制器

为了提高永磁直线同步电机伺服系统的鲁棒性,提出基于自抗扰思想的反步控制器。将永磁直线同步电机伺服系统中的未建模动态和外界扰动定义为总和扰动,并扩充为系统新的状态变量。设计了线性扩张状态观测器估计不可直接测量的直线电机动子速度以及总和扰动,证明并分析了设计的线性扩张状态观测器的收敛性和估计误差。利用线性扩张状态观测器的输出,基于动态补偿线性化思想设计了反步控制器。证明了考虑线性扩张状态观测器估计误差的闭环反馈控制系统的稳定性。在Googol公司的实验平台上,验证了设计的自抗扰反步控制器的可行性。     

采用扩展有限元法的线式爆炸分离装置裂纹扩展分析

为了提高线式爆炸分离装置的安全性,本研究基于扩展有限元法,通过创建二维和三维动态裂纹扩展模型,探索了线式爆炸分离装置在爆轰波作用过程中的动态裂纹扩展和止裂机理。研究表明,分离壳体的裂纹扩展路径独立于裂纹初始角度;不考虑载荷时序时,二维和三维动态裂纹扩展的主方向分别沿着分离壳体的径向和环向;考虑载荷时序时,受不同区域应力波的联合作用,三维裂纹沿环向扩展的同时会沿着轴向扩展,但裂纹的扩展均不会影响到止裂槽以外的结构。所提方法和相应结论可为线式爆炸分离装置设计提供参考。     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.     

Pakistan’s nuclear future: continued dependence on asymmetric escalation

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.     

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.     

Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea

ABSTRACT

This article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.