全文获取类型
收费全文 | 274篇 |
免费 | 39篇 |
国内免费 | 7篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 1篇 |
2022年 | 2篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 1篇 |
2019年 | 20篇 |
2018年 | 9篇 |
2017年 | 22篇 |
2016年 | 20篇 |
2015年 | 4篇 |
2014年 | 31篇 |
2013年 | 121篇 |
2012年 | 15篇 |
2011年 | 8篇 |
2010年 | 4篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 2篇 |
2007年 | 12篇 |
2006年 | 3篇 |
2005年 | 9篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 4篇 |
2002年 | 3篇 |
2001年 | 6篇 |
2000年 | 4篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有320条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
51.
Tanya Ogilvie-White 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):173-177
A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order, by William Walker. Routledge, 2012. 247 pages, $42.95. 相似文献
52.
Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero. 相似文献
53.
Sumit Ganguly 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):381-387
Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, by Feroz Hassan Khan. Stanford University Press, 2012. 544 pages, $29.95. Managing India's Nuclear Forces, by Verghese Koithara. Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 304 pages, $59.95. 相似文献
54.
Ward Wilson 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):421-439
Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity—a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned. 相似文献
55.
56.
Richard B. White 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(3-4):261-274
The Indian government has not made a public comment about the status of its nuclear weapon program since approving a nuclear doctrine in 2003. However, there is now enough information in the public domain to determine that the command-and-control system for the nuclear program has steadily matured in accordance with the intent of the approved nuclear doctrine. The Indian government has successfully mitigated many of the issues that plague the conventional military. The result is a basic command-and-control system that is focused only on the delivery, if ordered by the prime minister, of nuclear weapons. The system is not as robust as those of the United States and Russia, but is in place and ready as new Indian nuclear weapons enter into operation. The command-and-control system is developing to meet India's needs and political compulsions, but not necessarily as part of a more assertive nuclear policy. 相似文献
57.
Jeffrey S. Lantis 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(1):21-41
The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements surged during the “nuclear renaissance” of the past decade. This proliferation is only partially explained by the prevailing approaches that focus on strategic imperatives. To supplement these explanations, this study draws on neoliberal models of economic competition to posit that bilateral agreement negotiations also exhibit conditions of “uncoordinated interdependence” and maneuvering to gain market share. Case evidence suggests the contours of supplier state bids for civilian assistance are determined at least as much by considerations about economic competition as they are by positive strategic goals. In addition, this study identifies several cases of cooperation where there appears to be little or no strategic motive for export agreements. The study concludes that patterns of economic competition and the influence of peers in defined competitive spaces alter material payoffs and impact policies. It also identifies a surprising role for principled restraint in dampening strategic and economic competition in some dyads. 相似文献
58.
Paolo Foradori 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(2):189-205
Regrettably, moral arguments are largely absent from the current debate on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, complementing politico-strategic thinking with ethical categories could significantly strengthen the abolitionist call. To fill the gap, this article analyzes the evolution of the nuclear ethics of the Roman Catholic Church and especially its position on nuclear deterrence. If this strategy was granted interim and strictly conditioned moral acceptance during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is today increasingly considered ineffective, an obstacle to genuine disarmament, and hence morally unjustifiable. In the new security context, the conditions for the Catholic Church's “interim nuclear ethics” have altered, and nuclear disarmament has become a feasible option and an alternative strategy to deterrence. 相似文献
59.
Heinz Gaertner 《Defense & Security Analysis》2014,30(4):336-345
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power. 相似文献
60.
核动力装置一回路辅助系统失水事故的仿真研究 总被引:5,自引:2,他引:3
运用一种操作简便、计算速度快的工具软件对某核动力装置一回路辅助系统典型位置的失水事故进行了仿真.通过分析仿真结果得出不同位置的破口引起不同后果的事故,其中有些事故可以忽略,有些事故则相当严重. 相似文献