通用扩张状态观测器鲁棒飞行控制方法

针对存在参数不确定、外界干扰与测量噪声情况下飞行控制问题,提出一种基于通用扩张状态观测器的鲁棒飞行控制方法。首先基于状态相关的Riccati方程（SDRE）控制方法,对飞行器俯仰通道非线性模型进行扩展线性化;而后引入基于通用扩张状态观测器的控制方法,设计干扰补偿增益,实现对外界干扰的估计与补偿;最后通过在线解算状态相关矩阵及代数黎卡提方程,得出状态反馈增益与干扰补偿增益,实现对飞行器期望攻角的跟踪控制。通过与已有方法进行对比,验证了本文所提方法不仅对系统模型不确定性与外界干扰具有较强鲁棒性,而且在较大测量噪声情况下,其依然能够保证良好的跟踪控制效果,具有较强的工程应用价值。     

Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013     

New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Drawing on evidence collected from eyewitness interviews, new Russian secondary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both sides, the author significantly widens the academic understanding of the maritime dimension of this gravest crisis of the Cold War. Most significant is her conclusion that Soviet commanders were led by complex and challenging tactical circumstances, including unreliable communications and malfunctioning equipment, which might have prompted them to contemplate a resort to tactical nuclear weapons on more than one occasion. Almost as disturbing is the revelation that US forces were not aware of this particular threat. This research reveals how a chain of inadvertent developments at sea could have precipitated global nuclear war, underlining the extreme danger of the crisis.     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

Minimum deterrence and missile defenses: what's new,what's true,what's arguable

Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian–American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama “reset” in Russian–American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.     

Nuclear weapons,the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective

America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this underplays the importance of institutional factors: Allies have historically addressed a range of objectives through such cooperation, which has helped to catalyze agreements about broader alliance strategy. The varied form such cooperation takes in different alliances also flows from the respective bargaining power of allies and the relative importance of consensus, rather than perceived threats. The article concludes that nuclear weapons cooperation will remain crucial in successful U.S. alliance management, as allies negotiate their relationship with each other in the face of geostrategic change.     

船用反应堆堆芯物理计算软件包的研制

基于船用反应堆结构特点与运行方式 ,通过对核电站大型机版堆芯物理计算软件的移植与修改 ,研制了微机版船用反应堆堆芯物理计算软件包 .可用于船用反应堆燃料组件参数及堆芯三维细网临界与燃耗的计算研究     

弹道目标跟踪滤波方法研究

主要对弹道目标的跟踪滤波方法进行了综述,对扩展卡尔曼滤波（extended Kalman filter,EKF）、转换测量卡尔曼滤波（conversion measurement Kalman filter, CMKF）、基于弹道运动方程的扩展卡尔曼滤波（ballistic extended Kalman filter, BEKF）、基于弹道运动方程的无敏卡尔曼滤波（ballistic unscented Kalman filter, BUKF）4种滤波算法的关键点、优缺点进行了剖析。进一步利用仿真的弹道数据对4种滤波方法的效能进行了验证,对比了不同滤波器的滤波精度和再入目标的跟踪性能,分析了质阻比对滤波性能的影响,提出了选择和设计目标跟踪滤波方法时需要考虑的几个问题,为雷达滤波方法的选择和设计提供参考和依据。     

高功率电磁环境下导弹发射阵地近地面电磁脉冲波形仿真

主要研究在高功率电磁环境下高空核爆到达导弹预设作战阵地近地面时的电磁脉冲环境。首先给出高空核爆电磁脉冲场近地面计算的理论基础,然后分析不同条件下近地面的电磁脉冲环境参数,编程实现了基于时域有限差分算法的电磁脉冲波形数值仿真,完成了多种特定预设战场环境下的电磁脉冲计算,最后给出由于电磁脉冲武器的发展和HEMP波形表述形式变化,给导弹武器系统抗电磁脉冲性能研究带来的影响和新动态趋势。结论认为：应加强对前沿更陡、强度更强电磁脉冲的抵抗能力,防御重点放在机动作战样式方面,提高战地战时抗毁生存能力。     

自适应两步滤波算法在机载IRSTS被动定位中的应用

在机载红外搜索跟踪系统被动定位研究中,针对扩展卡尔曼滤波算法要求先验的噪声统计及存在系统观测模型线性化误差影响滤波精度的特点,利用两步滤波算法并结合Sage-Husa噪声估计器构建了适用于机载IRSTS被动定位特点的自适应两步滤波算法模型,算法不仅实时在线地估计了观测噪声的统计特性,而且避免了观测模型线性化误差.仿真结果表明,在完全相同的初始条件下,自适应两步滤波算法对目标运动参数的估计结果明显优于扩展卡尔曼滤波,从而提高了机载IRSTS被动定位的精度.