Callable products with dependent demands

Capacity providers such as airlines often sell the same capacity to different market segments at different prices to improve their expected revenues. The absence of a secondary market, due to the nontransferability of airline tickets, gives rise to an opportunity for airlines to broker capacity between consumers with different willingness to pay. One way to broker capacity is by the introduction of callable products. The idea is similar to callable bonds where the issuer has the right, but not the obligation, to buy back the bonds at a certain price by a certain date. The idea of callable products was introduced before under the assumption that the fare-class demands are all independent. The independent assumption becomes untenable when there is significant demand recovery (respectively, demand cannibalization) when lower fares are closed (respectively, opened). In this case, consumer choice behavior should be modeled explicitly to make meaningful decisions. In this paper, we consider a general consumer choice model and develop the optimal strategy for callable products. Our numerical study illustrates how callable products are win-win-win, for the capacity provider and for both high and low fare consumers. Our studies also identify conditions for callable products to result in significant improvements in expected revenues.     

当前战区陆军预备役部队民用运力动员初探

我国民用运力资源丰富.自2020年7月1日零时起,预备役部队全面纳入军队领导体制,改由党中央、中央军委集中统一领导.在此背景下,本文对民用运力动员的含义进行了深入剖析,分析了民用运力动员的主要任务和战区陆军部队对民用运力动员的要求,指出了预备役部队民用运力动员所面临的矛盾和困难,提出了推进民用运力动员的几点对策,如健全...     

论重建抗御火灾意识的必要性

通过分析抗御火灾的客观事实 ,从抗御火灾的公共配套设施、专用装备和人员保证三个方面揭示人类控制火灾的观念需要更新 ,指出人类控制火灾必须从人的观念上实现根本性转变 ,重建抗御火灾的意识。     

对当前消防法制建设的思考

论述了我国当前消防法制建设中存在的问题 :无法可依 ;有法难依 ;执法不严 ;违法难究。指出消防法制建设应该注意的问题 :建立完善科学的消防法规体系 ;明确政府职责 ,切实加强领导 ;进一步加强公安消防监督队伍建设。     

作战实验组织实施框架设计

为了规范指导实验人员有效开展作战实验,对作战实验组织实施框架进行了设计。通过忽略不同实验的细微差别,抽取作战实验组织实施的公共模式,从实验团队角度明确规定了实验的关键步骤,规范了实验组织实施过程和里程碑工作。能有效指导将实验对象的概念理解映射到实验系统中进行具体实验,保证了实验的成功实施。     

Flexible capacity strategy in an asymmetric oligopoly market with competition and demand uncertainty

This article studies flexible capacity strategy (FCS) under oligopoly competition with uncertain demand. Each firm utilizes either the FCS or inflexible capacity strategy (IFCS). Flexible firms can postpone their productions until observing the actual demand, whereas inflexible firms cannot. We formulate a new asymmetrical oligopoly model for the problem, and obtain capacity and production decisions of the firms at Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to verify that cross‐group competition determines the capacity allocation between the two groups of firms, while intergroup competition determines the market share within each group. Moreover, we show that the two strategies coexist among firms only when cost differentiation is medium. Counterintuitively, flexible firms benefit from increasing production cost when the inflexible competition intensity is sufficiently high. This is because of retreat of inflexible firms, flexibility effect, and the corresponding high price. We identify conditions under which FCS is superior than IFCS. We also demonstrate that flexible firms benefit from increasing demand uncertainty. However, when demand variance is not very large, flexible firms may be disadvantaged. We further investigate the effects of cross‐group and intergroup competition on individual performance of the firms. We show that as flexible competition intensity increases, inflexible firms are mainly affected by the cross‐group competition first and then by the intergroup competition, whereas flexible firms are mainly affected by the intergroup competition. Finally, we examine endogenous flexibility and identify its three drivers: cost parameters, cross‐group competition, and intergroup competition. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 117–138, 2017     

图形式火警救援C3系统

图形式火警救援C~3系统是一个先进的在国内首次实现的以微型机为主处理机,达到实用水平的火警救援C~3系统。系统设计以C~3I理论和技术为基础,以地图和图形为背景,以很低的投资获取了较高的技术性能和系统功能。本文概要地介绍了该系统的总体设计思想和若干主要技术问题。     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013     

一种基于节点资源利用率的无标度网络路由策略

本文研究了节点负载处理能力异质条件下的无标度网络交通动力学过程,提出了一种基于节点资源利用率的全局动态路由策略。该策略利用网络中节点资源利用率构建了一种全局代价函数,选择使该代价函数最小的路径来传输负载。实验结果表明该路由策略在略微增加平均路径长度的情况下成倍地提高了网络负载传输能力,与有效路由策略的比较进一步验证了该策略的有效性。     

Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry

We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007