Imperial nostalgia,the liberal lie,and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency

Since 9/11, counterinsurgency is back in fashion; the ‘war on terror’ has even been branded a ‘global counterinsurgency’. However the context within which counterinsurgency originally arose is critical to understanding the prospects for its present success; the radically changed environment in which it is currently being conducted casts into considerable doubt the validity of the doctrine's application by many national militaries currently ‘rediscovering’ this school of military thought today. Above all, classical counterinsurgency was a profoundly imperial, state-centric phenomenon; consequently it only rarely faced the thorny issue of sovereignty and legitimacy which bedevils and may doom these same efforts today.     

The challenges of Iraq: putting US Army stability operations doctrine to the test

The US Army develops doctrine as a set of fundamental principles that guide its actions in support of national objectives. Recently, those national objectives required stability operations, with increasing scope and frequency. This study examines whether existing US Army doctrine adequately fulfilled its role as a guide to tactics in addressing the challenges that Army forces faced in the first 15 months of the war in Iraq. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency has remedied many deficiencies, but several remain to be addressed to offer commanders better guidance in the face of the many complex challenges they face in stability operations.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR LEARNING

This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.     

Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze,Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm

ABSTRACT

This article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought.     

舰载火箭炮子母弹射击火力分配模型

摘 要：由于舰载火箭弹的弹道特性与普通身管炮弹有着明显的差异,传统的舰炮射击效力计算及火力分配方法不适用于舰载火箭炮。结合舰载火箭弹弹道特点,分析了其射击误差,探讨了集群目标的简化处理方法,提出了一种基于蒙特卡洛法的舰载火箭炮对岸射击最优效力射火力分配计算模型。通过举例分析表明,该方法切实可行,利用该模型可以提高射击指挥员指挥决策的科学性。     

FBN和JF402在泡沫洗消剂中的展开作用及其对泡沫性能的影响

研究了FBN、JF402 2种碳氟表面活性剂与发泡剂配伍后形成的水溶液在油面上的铺展及泡沫性能（发泡力和稳定性）。结果表明FBN、JF402的加入可提高体系的铺展能力。FBN的铺展性能好于JF402,但JF402泡沫性能好于FBN。     

绝热稳定性研究成果在工业企业防火教学中的应用

公安部科研项目“反应性物质热稳定性的分级方法研究”在国内首次利用绝热加速量热法系统研究了反应性物质的热稳定性。该项目研究成果在物质与生产火灾危险性辨识、火灾原因调查与分析等方面具有现实指导意义。在《工业企业防火》课程教学过程中,部分项目研究成果纳入了“影响储存和生产火灾危险性的因素”、“危险化学品的危险特性”“仓库防火”以及“重大危险源辨识”等章节的教学内容,使学生对课程内容有了更为深入地理解。科研成果与教学内容的有机结合,既显著提高了学生的学习主动性和学习兴趣,又大大增强了学生的创新性意识。     

射表误差及对射击精度的影响分析

以车载武器为研究对象,明确了射表的作用和基本要求,分析了射表误差的组成因素和简要计算方法,在此基础上剖析了射表误差对射击精度的影响。提出了射表误差是目前条件下影响车载武器射击精度主要因素的观点,可对研究车载武器射击精度提供一定参考。