高炮武器系统虚拟射击试验方法

首先介绍了高炮武器系统对空射击精度试验现状,针对传统试验方法存在的成本高昂、组织繁琐、试验周期长等不足,提出了一种基于抽样的虚拟射击试验方法,介绍了虚拟射击试验原理,给出了虚拟射击试验系统结构图,重点讨论了各系统的主要功能,最后给出了虚拟射击试验的数据流分析、组织实施流程和验证思路。     

Huber加权的频率稳定度非相关差分抗差估计方法

计算原子钟频率稳定度时,钟差观测异常会导致Allan方差出现较大的估计偏差。建立Allan方差的差分估计模型,根据钟差的差分序列统计特性分析了相关差分估计的噪声识别与白化等计算复杂度问题;针对上述难点提出一种基于Huber权函数的非相关差分抗差估计方法,建立一种非相关差分序列的构造方法,有效避免了复杂的噪声识别及白化计算;给出Allan方差的非相关差分抗差估计的推导,并对抗差过程引入的误差累积给出了一种抵消方法;给出完整的抗差估计方案,并利用实测数据进行了实验验证。实验结果表明本方法对相位单点跳变、相位阶跃跳变具有显著的抗差能力,抗差估计可使异常引入的相对偏差由近200%降至10%以内。     

一种用于越肩发射截获区分析的方法

在越肩发射原理仿真 4进行后 ,提出了一种新的方法用于越肩发射的截获区分析。与传统的弹道处理方法相比 ,这种方法主要是把越肩发射作为一个物理过程考虑 ,而不是仅仅考虑是否命中 ,这样就可以综合考虑影响越肩发射整个过程的各个因素。通过采用这种方法分析越肩发射截获区 ,在最后得出一些有益且不同与过去弹道分析的结论。     

图像制导导弹火控系统设计

针对车载图像制导导弹武器打击任务多样、作战使用灵活、多弹种、多人协同操作等特点,详细描述了火控系统功能需求分析、系统构型、工作原理、人机配合和信息交互等设计过程。由于系统任务的高效执行取决于操作人员对综合信息的准确掌握和对设备的便利操控,重点说明了以人员操控为主导,设备智能化处理配合完成工作流程控制的设计思想。该设计方法已成功应用于某型导弹武器火控系统的设计过程中,经试验验证,火控系统的功能、性能及操纵效果满足要求,且满足模块化、信息化、智能化等通用要求。     

浅析建构武警反恐维稳学科的必要性

摘要：反恐维稳对武警部队教育训练内容提出了新的要求,学科建设必须紧紧围绕反恐维稳之需调整结构;反恐维稳对战术手段的运用提出了新的要求,学科建设必须进行反恐维稳战法创新;反恐维稳学科建设必须把新兴反恐维稳装备的研制,作为部队装备更新之本。     

The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.     

Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes?

Sixteen years after stepping out of the nuclear closet, India's nuclear posture, some of its operational practices, and hardware developments are beginning to mimic those of the original five nuclear weapon states. Several proliferation scholars in the United States contend that India's national security managers are poised to repeat the worst mistakes of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, with negative consequences for deterrence, crisis, and stability in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This article takes a contrarian view. It dissects the best available data to show why the alarmist view is overstated. It argues that not only are the alarmists’ claims unsupported by evidence, their interpretation of the skeletal and often contradictory data threatens to construct the very threat they prophesize.     

一类随机生态-流行病系统的分析

对一类食饵染病的随机食饵-捕食者系统,应用伊藤公式,给出系统均衡解的全局随机渐近稳定的条件,并通过数值模拟对理论结果进行论证.