64mm催泪弹的空中运动特性研究

建立64mm催泪弹外弹道数学模型,分析64mm催泪弹的空中运动状态,找出影响64mm催泪弹飞行稳定性的主要因素,给出64mm催泪弹的改进方向和技术措施,以提高催泪弹的可靠性和作用有效性,并指导现装备的催泪弹的改进和新型催泪弹的设计。     

对海射击指挥系统中成果法决定诸元数学模型的优化

由于海防炮兵目标出现的范围大,传统的利用射击成果决定目标射击开始诸元的方法很难满足射击开始诸元的精度。通过对成果法决定诸元的误差分析,得出影响精度的主要原因。我们在已知弹道风的情况下,对原成果法作业的数学模型进行优化,提出了在利用成果行大方向转移射击的情况下减小诸元误差的方法,并进行了分析论证,对地面炮兵具有较大参考价值。     

Riccati传递矩阵法在潜艇结构强度和稳定性分析中的应用

运用Riccati传递矩阵方法,建立了旋转壳单元的场传递矩阵,推导了肋骨和母线倾角不连续位置的点传递矩阵,在推导中考虑了肋骨各方向可能的变形,编制了用于分析组合加肋旋转壳应力和稳定性的计算机程序(应力程序SAPRi,稳定性程序BAPRi)。利用SAPRi程序和BAPRi程序对潜艇耐压结构的典型结构算例进行了应力和稳定性分析,并将计算结果与理论结果或商用软件(MSC/NASTRAN)的计算结果进行比较,表明该程序结果正确可信,计算速度快,适合于工程应用。     

光电型舰炮武器系统对海校射模拟训练的实现

针对目前光电型舰炮武器系统模拟训练设备的特点,介绍了以光电跟踪仪为传感器的舰炮武器系统对海校射及其模拟的基本原理,以及主要技术实现和工作过程,并列举了其在武器射击操作模拟训练等方面的应用。该原理很好的提高了光电型舰炮武器系统的射击精度,同时也为系统的日常维护和检查提供了多方面的帮助。     

Acrimony,asymmetry, and the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship

ABSTRACT

While most contemporary analyses of South Asian nuclear dynamics acknowledge the presence of a strategic triangle between the region’s three nuclear players, the primary focus usually remains on the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Discussions of Sino-Indian relations remain limited. This is likely attributed to the stability in the two countries’ relations, yet it is worth asking why this stability exists and whether it is likely to continue in the future. Although China and India have an acrimonious relationship, their asymmetric nuclear capabilities and threat perceptions mitigate the danger of a traditional security dilemma. India may perceive China’s nuclear aggrandizement to be a security threat, but the same is not true of China, which has a vastly superior nuclear force and is largely shaping its nuclear-force structure in response to the threat it perceives from the United States. This dynamic makes a serious conventional or nuclear conflict highly unlikely.     

Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea

ABSTRACT

This article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program.