人工免疫在军事领域的应用

人工免疫学是继神经网络、进化计算之后新的智能计算研究领域和研究热点.为探讨人工免疫可运用的军事领域,给相关科研工作者提供新方法、新思路,对生物免疫系统的一些概念进行了介绍,简要分析了生物免疫系统中的免疫机制,人工免疫系统基本特征,然后着重分析了该学科在信息系统安全、防御系统设计、目标识别、故障诊断、优化、火力分配等方面中的应用.     

低慢小无人机对军事区域的安全威胁及其应对方法

低慢小无人机具有小型化、红外与雷达暴露征候小、飞行高度低、飞行轨迹不定以及购买使用几乎无门槛等特征,给当前全球军事区域和军事行动安全带来了新的挑战.本文首先分析了世界主要国家对低慢小无人机的界定、国内外管控情况和相关威胁事件;然后,从低慢小无人机的侦察袭击能力、军事区域现有安防措施和低慢小无人机对军事区域进行侦察的相关...     

Models of sensor operations for border surveillance

This article is motivated by the diverse array of border threats, ranging from terrorists to arms dealers and human traffickers. We consider a moving sensor that patrols a certain section of a border with the objective to detect infiltrators who attempt to penetrate that section. Infiltrators arrive according to a Poisson process along the border with a specified distribution of arrival location, and disappear a random amount of time after their arrival. The measures of effectiveness are the target (infiltrator) detection rate and the time elapsed from target arrival to target detection. We study two types of sensor trajectories that have constant endpoints, are periodic, and maintain constant speed: (1) a sensor that jumps instantaneously from the endpoint back to the starting‐point, and (2) a sensor that moves continuously back and forth. The controlled parameters (decision variables) are the starting and end points of the patrolled sector and the velocity of the sensor. General properties of these trajectories are investigated. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

重大活动安全警卫工作之我见

当前,重要会议、重大活动已经成为群众上访制造事端扩大影响的首选目标。同时,也成为敌对分子、恐怖组织企图实施阴谋暗害和恐怖破坏活动的主要选择场所。为防止上述事件发生,警卫部队要处理好三种关系,掌握情报信息。严密部署。     

警卫基础建设相关问题研究

加强警卫基础建设对于提高警卫部队的战斗力具有重要意义。近年来,公安警卫部队的基础建设取得了巨大成绩,但是也有几个问题需要引起高度重视。要注意基层警卫部队人少任务重的问题,更应加强军事和业务训练。在基础工作中要注重增强科技含量,也不能忽视传统做法,更要从构建社会主义和谐社会的高度努力改进警卫形式。     

治安管理学实践教学应用研究

在《治安管理学》教学中加强实践教学,是由其学科特点与授课对象特点决定的,也是为了提高学员第一任职能力与实现教学相长的需要。应通过课堂实践教学、校内实践模拟教学与校外实践基地相结合的方式,加强实践教学在《治安管理学》教学中的具体应用,对于实现《治安管理学》教学目标与我院人才培养目标具有重要意义。     

自杀式恐怖袭击对警卫工作的威胁及其防范

近年来,越来越多的恐怖组织选择了自杀式恐怖袭击作为实现自身目的的方式,给世界各国人民的生命财产安全带来了深重的灾难,也给警卫工作带来了严重威胁。了解自杀式恐怖袭击的攻击目标、手段,认识其对警卫工作的严重危害,认真思考防范、打击对策,对确保警卫安全具有重要的现实意义。     

全球化时代的移民与国家安全：风险评估及其控制

移民具有经济、社会、政治等多重属性,其对国家安全的影响也涉及多个领域,且具有很强的不确定性。而地缘政治地位关键、领土存在国际争议、非劳动力要素供给缺乏弹性、族群认同超越国家认同和政府履行社会管理职能存在结构性缺陷等条件变量的作用,会显著增加移民的安全风险。这意味着控制移民安全风险的关键在于抑制或消除这些条件变量的作用。     

SIP协议安全威胁分析

众所周知,Vo IP技术在未来语音通信中所占的比重越来越大。随着Vo IP的不断发展,基于SIP协议的Vo IP应用也不断增多。但是,由于SIP协议高度依赖于开放的IP网络,使得其安全性逐渐成为关注和探讨的焦点。主要分析了SIP协议网络面临的一些安全威胁,包括典型的外部攻击技术和协议自身存在的漏洞等。探讨了为应对SIP安全威胁提出的加密、认证等安全策略并且分析了这些安全策略的优缺点,提出了针对SIP安全策略进一步改进的方向,旨在不断提高和完善基于SIP协议的安全性能。     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.