双机空战的仿真与分析

用矩阵博弈理论、计算机仿真的方法研究了空战过程,使双机的空中格斗阶段─目标的跟踪、射击、弹道计算及射击效果的评定连续化,并用ＦＯＲＴＲＡＮ─７７语言编程在计算机上进行了Ｆ＿Ａ、Ｆ＿Ｂ两种飞行的空战,仿真结果与实际情况基本一致。本程序具有通用性,可对不同种类的飞机及武器系统的性能作出定性和定量的分析和评估。     

数据融合技术与潜艇指控系统的发展

就潜艇指控系统的现状和发展,综述了数据融合技术在潜艇指控系统中的应用前景。     

倒向随机微分方程在欧式期权中的应用

假设市场为无套利市场,而且市场上只有两种证券:一种是无风险债券;一种是有风险的股票。通过自筹资策略,得到期权价格所满足的倒向随机微分方程(BSDE),利用倒向随机微分方程给出欧式期权价格概率表示;并证明欧式期权的完全套期保值性。     

Vicarious warfare: The counterproductive consequences of modern American military practice

This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.     

军事攻防中的多属性资源分配对策模型

针对资源受限情形下的两阶段攻防资源分配问题,提出一种基于多属性决策的资源分配对策模型。防守者首先将有限的防护资源分配到不同的目标上,继而进攻者选择一种威胁组合方式对目标实施打击。基于博弈论相关知识,模型的求解结果可以使防守者最小化自身损失,使进攻者最大化进攻收益。同时,针对模型的特点,给出了一些推论和证明。通过一个示例验证了模型的合理性以及相关推论的准确性,能够为攻、防双方规划决策提供辅助支持。     

攻击主动防御飞行器的微分对策制导律

基于微分对策理论设计了躲避护卫弹的同时攻击飞行器的制导律。根据传统的性能指标推导了该场景的微分对策制导律,并且根据权重系数的取值定义了三种制导律:最优追赶制导律、逃脱-追赶制导律和复合制导律。最优追赶制导律容易被护卫弹拦截,逃脱-追赶制导律容易造成导弹和飞行器的零控脱靶量急剧增大而使得攻击失败,复合制导律很难选择合适的权重系数。针对以上不足,提出了两种改进的制导律,并对该两种制导律的适用情况进行了分析。通过非线性模型仿真,验证了这两种方法的可行性。该两种制导律目的性强,攻击导弹可以躲避护卫弹进而攻击飞行器。     

Think again – supplying war: reappraising military logistics and its centrality to strategy and war

This article argues that logistics constrains strategic opportunity while itself being heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning. With the academic literature all but ignoring the centrality of logistics to strategy and war, this article argues for a reappraisal of the critical role of military logistics, and posits that the study and conduct of war and strategy are incomplete at best or false at worst when they ignore this crucial component of the art of war. The article conceptualises the logistics–strategy nexus in a novel way, explores its contemporary manifestation in an age of uncertainty, and applies it to a detailed case study of UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

Classical geopolitics,realism and the balance of power theory

Since the end of World War II, classical geopolitics as a particular form of realism has been disengaged from the development of mainstream realist theories. This disengagement has not only concealed the value of classical geopolitics as a framework of analysis for policy and strategy, but also created an increasing rift between theory and policy in contemporary realist theories. This paper seeks to reengage classical geopolitics with mainstream realist theories by clarifying its realist traits and analytical characteristics, (re)stating its core propositions and probing into its potential contribution to the development of mainstream realist theories. This paper contends that classical geopolitics, while having a distinctive pedigree, can arguably be considered an integral part of the family of realist theories in view of its basic theoretical assumptions concerning international anarchy, the unit of analysis and power politics. As a framework of analysis, classical geopolitics incorporates three interrelated strategic propositions. Those three propositions not only constitute the theoretical core of classical geopolitics, but also manifest a peculiar balance-of-power conception that is essentially distinct from those proposed by mainstream realist theories. This paper argues that those three propositions combined promise to fill in prominent lacuna in the balance-of-power research programme, and also have significant implications for contemporary world politics.     

The Russian hybrid warfare strategy – neither Russian nor strategy

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its initial actions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the term hybrid warfare has received much public attention. Many have argued that the Russian actions we saw in Ukraine were part of a completely new strategy while others have suggested that there was nothing new in Russia’s actions. This article takes a critical look at these claims. Through the assessment of the history of the term hybrid warfare and a rigorous analysis of the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, this study finds that the Russian hybrid warfare strategy is rather a western myth than a formal comprehensive Russian strategic concept. Additionally, through the assessment of the Russian use of information operations and the way she has utilised the cyberspace in several recent conflicts, the study finds that against all claims Russia did not make these areas its main battlefield, but rather has been using them in support of its traditional concepts.