军用认知无线电网络中功率控制博弈算法的探讨

通过对比军用认知无线功率控制博弈模型与一些经典的功率控制博弈算法,提出了一种认知无线电网络中的功率控制的博弈算法。通过仿真结果性能分析,证明算法具有一定的优越性,并且能够为军事无线通信提供一定的理论依据和现实作用。     

地方物流供应商“偷懒”行为监管机制研究

军民融合现代军事物流体系中,地方物流供应商往往会"偷懒",这必将损害军民融合现代军事物流体系的整体绩效。首先描述了"偷懒"行为及其危害性,从机制入手,基于博弈论建立地方物流供应商"偷懒"行为监管机制;分析并证明了监管机制的有效性。这一机制的构建对于监管地方物流供应商具有重要作用。     

混合均衡问题和不动点问题的公共元的迭代算法

在Hilbert空间中,利用超梯度算法,用以逼近混合均衡问题的解集与半压缩映像不动点集的公共元,并且证明了该算法的收敛性。使用新的分析技巧证明了一个强收敛定理。     

电传动履带车辆转向行驶控制策略仿真研究

以双侧电机独立驱动这一典型电传动方案为研究对象,针对转向行驶控制的难题,提出了基于功率-转速复合调节的转向行驶控制策略,对驾驶员操控信号进行了解析,基于Matlab软件和RecurDyn软件建立了电传动车辆的机电一体联合仿真模型,对车辆典型转向工况进行了仿真试验,验证了转向行驶控制策略的有效性。     

直接力/气动力复合控制系统鲁棒稳定性分析

脉冲发动机作为直接力与空气舵复合控制能有效提高导弹的快速性和末端大过载机动能力。由于脉冲发动机的喷流干扰会对复合控制系统的稳定性产生影响,本文在考虑脉冲发动机自身喷流因子效应以及对导弹气动干扰的情况下,把直接力喷流作用等效为弹体的气动力进行建模,并结合复合控制系统的性能指标以及稳定判据,对一类复合控制自动驾驶仪的鲁棒稳定性进行了分析,给出了直接力喷流作用下复合控制系统的满足性能要求的稳定边界。     

监视雷达低仰角测角方法分析与工程实现

监视雷达天线孔径较小、垂直波束较宽,当雷达天线低仰角探测目标时,波束打地严重,测量易受多路径影响,仰角测量精度难以满足要求.先对现代雷达常用的和差比幅与比相两种测角方法进行了分析,然后以相控阵天线为例,对两者在低仰角下的测向精度进行了仿真和深入分析.最后结合两种方法的优缺点,对某Ⅰ型监视雷达样机进行改进,使其满足比幅比相混合型测角的条件,并对改进后的样机作动态对比试验,再次证明两种常用测角算法在低仰角下的优劣,为工程应用提供参考.     

Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

以色列反恐情报战略探讨

以色列是世界上第一个遭受国际恐怖主义威胁的国家。但通过明确分工和行之有效的反恐措施,以色列已经能够对付不断升级的恐怖主义威胁。自“9·11”事件以来,全球许多国家都开始向以色列求教国土安全方面的知识和专业技术。     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007