C2组织探索性分析框架设计研究

以验证组织优化设计方法为目的,将探索性分析思想引入组织优化设计研究,根据探索性分析的特点与组织优化设计方法验证的具体需要,对C2组织探索性分析的过程进行了研究,初步设计了面向C2组织的探索性分析框架并对其中的关键技术进行了分析。     

目标通视性检测建模与仿真

在战斗机对地攻击选择武器投放位置以及巡航导弹选择地标点时,必须验证其选择位置的合理性,因此通视性检测是战斗机对地攻击规划的关键技术之一。提出了一种目标通视性检测的建模方法,分析了地形遮蔽盲区构成因素,给出了数字地图处理方法,建立了地形遮蔽盲区计算模型及发现目标概率模型,实现了目标的通视性检测,并进行了仿真验证。该模型为战斗机对地攻击选择武器投放位置和验证导弹地标点选择合理性提高了方法。     

基于复杂网络的作战网络分析

分布式网络化作战是网络中心战的基础,而分布式作战网络的构建是网络化作战的重要前提。首先,运用复杂网络的相关参数分析了多种不同的网络,选择了BA非标度网络作为分布式作战网络的最优表现形式;其次,以BA非标度网络为基础提出了一个适合军事上动态鲁棒性分析的模型DCNCE;最后,仿真结果表明,在以网络效能值为测度的对比下,分布式作战网络在介数毁伤策略下更脆弱,为构建并改进现有的作战网络提供了理论依据。     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Information security: Designing a stochastic‐network for throughput and reliability

Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

助推滑翔飞行器复合控制系统线性化小偏差运动方程推导与控制系统设计

助推滑翔技术是制导武器实现增加射程、提高机动突防能力的关键技术之一,对飞行器姿态控制有较高的要求,需要设计复合控制方式的姿态控制系统.针对采用空气舵与燃气舵联动控制的飞行器,建立了动力学模型,详细推导了完整的三通道线性化小偏差运动方程,结合典型弹道数据给出了动力系数图像,分析了助推滑翔弹道各飞行段中飞行器的稳定性,在此基础上选取再入段低空飞行特征点进行了姿控系统设计,仿真结果验证了线性化小偏差运动方程的正确性和控制系统的有效性,为进行此类飞行器的稳定性分析与姿态控制系统设计提供了有益的参考.     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

智能化作战指挥模式需求

智能装备已经走入军队、走向战场,创建智能化作战指挥模式是智能化时代作战指挥的必然发展趋势,智能化作战指挥模式需求分析可为智能作战问题研究提供有效的信息。智能化作战指挥模式的需求分析已经具备了一定的物质、理论和技术基础,同时,也具有了一定的构建思路、实践条件和实验平台。在此基础上,本文从军事需求、功能需求和技术需求以及构建要求四个不同角度进行需求分析,以找准创建需求,为后续工作进一步展开奠定基础。     

Analysis of some critical aspects in hot machining of Ti-5553 superalloy: Experimental and FE analysis

In this study, a newly developed titanium superalloy, i.e., the Ti-5553 alloy has used for hot machining. This material replaced Ti-grade-5 alloy in the application of aerospace, automobile, and biomedical sector. However, similar to Ti-grade-5 alloy, the Ti-5553 alloy has a low thermal conductivity which makes it difficult-to-cut material categories hence, high tool wear, cutting force and bad surface finish. Hot machining of Ti-5553 has been studied at different machining condition (room and hot) using Deform-2D finite element analysis. The result from the simulation test was compared with the experimental value and reduction of cutting and thrust forces was observed. The experiment was carried out with the same input parameters as simulation, and good coherence between them observed. Additionally, cutting zone temperature, effective stress, etc. for both room and elevated the temperature are also discussed.