基于预配装思想的物资混装配载优化策略

提出了一种基于预配载思想的装备物资混装配载策略,并应用模糊聚类和混合智能算法进行了实例仿真。研究对于组合优化策略在装备保障信息化系统建设中的应用具有积极意义。     

基于凸优化理论的三维微分对策制导规律求解

针对三维微分对策制导律(DGL)求解问题,引入凸优化理论,将DGL求解归结到Hamilton系统的求解,设计了DGL求解算法,通过对代价函数梯度特征的凸分析,推导出对策系统鞍点存在的充要条件和求解方法,解决了以往通过对微分对策模型简化求解导致的模型不能客观反映作战过程的问题.     

基于灰色系统理论的军队油料节约人员360度绩效评估

基于360度绩效评估理论,从德、能、勤、绩4个方面构建了包含4个1级指标和16个2级指标的军队油料节约人员360度绩效评估指标体系。利用层次分析法确定了各评估指标的权重,运用灰色系统理论的原理和方法,构建了多层次灰色评估模型,并对某油料节约小组5位油料节约人员进行了360度绩效评估。案例应用表明,此方法具有系统综合各层评估者提供的"贫信息"的优点,不仅能得出被评估者的灰类及优劣顺序,而且得到了各指标所属灰类和具体的灰色评价权值,使360度绩效较好地实现了绩效反馈的目的。该研究为军队油料节约人员绩效管理工作提供了新的思路和方法。     

坦克搭乘输送平台海上射击目标决策方法

通过粗糙集方法分析影响坦克对岸滩目标射击效果的各种因素,建立坦克搭乘输送平台海上射击的知识表达系统,将射击效果作为决策属性,将已有数据或作战经验作为条件属性,依粗糙集理论方法挖掘射击决策规则,最后约简得到一些简单的射击决策规则,为单坦克射击决策提供依据。     

Right Intention and the Ends of War

The jus ad bellum criterion of right intention (CRI) is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, which, left unresolved, leaves us without a plausible interpretation of the CRI. This constitutes a significant and novel reason for leaving the CRI out of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC).     

Rethinking Military Virtue Ethics in an Age of Unmanned Weapons

Although most styles of military ethics are hybrids that draw on multiple ethical theories, they are usually based primarily on the model of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is well-suited for regulating the conduct of soldiers who have to make quick decisions on the battlefield, but its applicability to military personnel is threatened by the growing use of unmanned weapon systems. These weapons disrupt virtue ethics’ institutional and cultural basis by changing what it means to display virtue and transforming the roles soldiers perform and the nature of the military profession itself. I argue that in light of these challenges to virtue ethics, at least as it is traditionally understood within the armed forces, soldiers operating unmanned weapons require a more heavily rule-based approach to military ethics.     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

采用随机矩阵理论的水声阵列SMI-MVDR空间谱估计技术

对角加载MVDR技术是一种经典的空间谱估计技术,在水声阵列信号处理中有着广泛的应用。该技术之所以具有较好的性能是由于其通过对角加载使样本协方差矩阵的特征值分散度减小。提出了基于随机矩阵理论的MVDR空间谱估计技术,具体思路是利用随机矩阵特征值的极限性质实现样本协方差矩阵噪声的抑制,以达到类似对角加载能够实现的特征值分散度减小的效果。仿真表明所提出的方法与对角加载方法达到了同样的目的,且当快拍数一定,而信噪比由小变大时,该方法可以达到与对角加载MVDR技术相当的性能;当信噪比设为定值,快拍数由小变大时,其与对角加载技术具有相同的DOA估计成功概率变化趋势,且在小样本情况下,此方法优势较为明显。     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017