子自仿射集的Hausdorff维数

设S1,S2 ,… ,SN 是Rn 上的N个仿射压缩映射 ,若Rn 的紧子集E满足E UNi =1 Si(E) ,则称E为子自仿射集 .作者在一定条件下得到了子自仿射集E的Hausdorff维数 .     

同类防空武器多层防御部署分析

在现代防空中,经常是防空武器多层部署进行防空,故需要对防空武器多层防御部署进行分析.针对同类防空武器多层防御部署的问题,运用排队论,建立了防御体系射击效能的数学模型.按照模型,通过实验仿真,对计算得到的实验数据进行分析,推测出同类防空武器的部署规律,并对防御体系应部署的适宜层数进行了一定的讨论.通过理论推导,证明了部署规律的正确性.最后建立了需求分析模型,运用部署规律对模型进行求解,通过对实例进行计算,给出了求解的基本步骤.     

不同类型防空武器多层防御部署分析

在现代防空中,经常由不同类型的防空武器多层部署联合进行防空,故需要对不同类型的防空武器多层防御部署进行分析.针对不同类型防空武器多层防御部署的问题,以排队论为基础,建立了防御体系射击效能的数学模型.按照模型,通过对仿真的实验数据进行分析,推测出不同类型防空武器的部署规律.最后,通过理论推导,证明了部署规律的正确性.     

Franchising cooperation through chance cross‐constrained games

This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000     

物元理论在优选对地打击目标中的应用

优选对地打击目标是现代信息化战争条件下联合作战对地火力协调中心在计划火力时的首要任务。旨在从目标的重要性、可靠性、射击紧迫性及对其射击时自身被发现的机会四个因素入手,举例证明如何构造物元模型,做到定性与定量相结合,对于编制炮兵C4I系统计划火力软件具有一定的参考价值。     

GM(1，1)模型与指数回归模型的比较与研究

GM(1,1)模型与指数回归模型都是对具有指数或近似指数规律的系列数据建立的数学模型。通过对两种模型进行比较与研究,发现一方面,利用数据列的灰指数特性建立指数回归模型,可以简单地实现数据列的预测过程;另一方面,利用指数回归模型可以对灰色理论的GM(1,1)模型进行控制和优化。     

灰色数列预测应用分析

对灰色理论与统计分析在装备经济管理工作中的实用性分别以模型机理、模型数据处理复杂性和模型结果精度三方面进行了比较分析,着重指出在某些情况下灰色模型具有小样本而精度高的特点,并列举了实例加以说明．     

装备保障体制研究的现状与发展

论述了装备保障体制研究的目的、意义 ,以及装备保障体制研究的概况 ,总结了装备保障体制研究的主要成果 ,指出了装备保障体制研究中存在的主要问题及今后研究的方向。     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.