Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

The case of Donald Rumsfeld: leadership traps in national security

Taking its point of departure in Donald Rumsfeld’s second term as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), this article analyses the crisis of strategic leadership in Western national security. Three “traps” are identified that explain why Donald Rumsfeld ultimately was a failure as defence secretary and demonstrate the perils of national security governance. These traps are termed the inquisitor trap, the strong leader trap and the delegation trap. It is argued that our understanding of strategic leadership in national security, particularly in defence, can benefit from insights gained from the study of strategic leadership in business. As such, this article engages the recent trend of merging insights from business and military strategy.     

基于RBAC的分布式数据库系统安全管理技术

分析了分布式数据库系统安全管理的必要性 ,引入了基于角色的访问控制模型 ,结合分布式数据库系统的开发实例 ,阐述了利用Delphi实现基于SQLServer的分布式数据库系统安全管理的技术。     

Effective in battle: conceptualizing soldiers’ combat effectiveness*

How do we understand combat effectiveness – soldiers’ performance in battle? Despite the broad consensus that understanding combat effectiveness is important both for scholars and policymakers, there is widespread disagreement about what combat effectiveness is. More specifically, studies of effectiveness tend to focus on either the skill of soldiers in battle, or their will to fight. Yet both skill and will are essential components of an effective fighting force. This article argues that understanding combat effectiveness requires understanding both of these key components of effectiveness. In other words, combat effectiveness requires both the skill and will to engage the enemy in an organized manner. It then demonstrates the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of British, Indian, and Australian forces fighting the Japanese during the Second World War. Only when scholars are talking about the same concept will our understanding of the conditions under which militaries are effective in battle progress. By comparing different units fighting the same opponent under the same material conditions, I demonstrate that units vary both in their combat skill and their will to fight, and that understanding their effectiveness in battle requires analyzing both of these key factors.     

Governing risks in international security

Risks are omnipresent in contemporary international security. Despite a long tradition in security studies going at least back to Von Clausewitz, we consider that the topic of risk remains under-examined. This forum seeks to advance the research agenda on risk in security studies by showcasing work of scholars using advanced concepts of risk, based on insights from sociology, biology, psychology, and safety studies, to better understand the role of risk in international security. As a way of introduction, this short article sets out the main debates.     

The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies

ABSTRACT

The United States has provided substantial amounts of military assistance and aid since the end of World War Two. During the Cold War, it proved vital in protecting numerous regimes from communist takeovers. Successful outcomes occurred when American leaders made large initial aid commitments, and the states had the capacity and political willpower to use it effectively. However, Vietnam was an example of how U.S. support lagged, as leaders in Saigon preferred political survival instead of creating regime legitimacy. Following 9/11, American security aid focused on making weak countries develop stronger security forces. Unfortunately, this created Fabergé egg militaries: expensive and easily broken by insurgents. This article suggests long-term strategic commitments need to be made alongside more resources for the American State Department and similar organizations to focus on the politics of state-building. Finally, this article suggests strategies, such as “whole-of-government” approaches, to improve long-term security and political institution building.     

深海安全问题的认识思考

贯彻落实总体国家安全观,既需关注传统领域安全,又需关注新兴领域安全.深海作为新兴战略领域,研究深海安全意义重大.从安全研究的视角出发,初步思考了深海开发建设过程中需要关注的几个安全问题,可为深海安全深化研究提供支撑,希望引发更多的人去关注深海安全,促进深海开发与深海安全和谐发展.     

嵌入式浏览器中SSL的设计与实现

针对嵌入式浏览器信息传输的安全性问题和嵌入式软件的特点,介绍了SSL协议,提出了一种在嵌入式浏览器中实现对SSL协议支持的方法.通过分析影响SSL协议客户端性能的因素,对SSL的实现过程进行了适当的优化,使用会话恢复机制、只对服务器进行验证的简单握手模式、减少TCP调用次数和优化对批量数据加密算法等方法,实现了嵌入式浏览器对SSL协议的支持;并介绍了方法在嵌入式浏览器JARI_Browser中的实现过程.实际的应用验证了该方法的可行性和正确性.     

基于地理信息平台的公安边防综合指挥系统建设研究

在深入调研公安边防部队各级指挥中心业务开展的基础上,分析了当前公安边防部队指挥系统存在的问题,提出了利用地理信息平台建立适应当前边防部队业务需要的综合指挥系统的可行性及具体思路。     

警卫专业综合演练的原则

专业综合演练对专业教学来讲是一个全新的课题,需要进行多方面的探索和实践。从研究警卫专业综合演练的原则入手,提出了组织实施综合演练应当遵循的几个原则。目的在于恰当地把握和评估演练,使演练更好地为提高学员执勤和处突能力服务。