基于模糊理论的空袭目标威胁判断模型

对空袭目标威胁度进行合理排序是提高防空效能的重要因素。分析了影响空袭目标威胁度的各种因素,利用模糊综合评判的思想,建立了一种进行目标威胁判断的模型,并根据具体情况给出了排序的合理方法。通过实例,给出了具体的计算过程,并将此方法得出的结果与文献中的方法得出的结果进行了比较,充分说明了模型的可行性。     

基于试验研究的大型油罐冷却用水量估算

根据利用移动摇摆炮对10×10^4m^3着火油罐冷却试验的结果,对大型着火油罐冷却用水量实验和理论数据进行对比分析,得出冷却用水量的估算方法,为大型油罐火灾扑救提供参考和依据。     

信号分割修正聚类的星座图恢复算法

通过分析载波估计频偏、信号长度对星座图恢复的影响,采用将长信号分割为短信号的方法减小频偏对星座图恢复的干扰,并通过旋转叠加修正的方法解决了由信号长度减小导致码元失去历遍性而带来的星座图恢复不完整问题,最后根据信噪比大小选取不同聚类算法进行聚类并再次修正,实现了星座图对称的幅相调制信号的星座图完整恢复。多次仿真表明,该算法对频偏估计精度的要求可以降低1~2个数量级,减小了参数估计的工作量,使因参数估计精度不高而带来的信号后续分析困难问题得到了良好解决。     

有源干扰条件下基于NSGA-Ⅱ的雷达网优化部署方法

在有源干扰条件下,雷达网部署直接影响着防区内指挥信息系统的预警监测能力。由于防区内由分散于不同位置,且重要度不同的责任区组成的,那么实现全方位全纵深的预警能力,将是雷达网部署的重要方面。根据覆盖系数和重叠系数为主要优化目标,基于NSGA-Ⅱ算法进行多目标优化。首先定义了覆盖系数和全局重叠系数两个指标,尤其是全局重叠系数打破了以往重叠系数的概念,从全局出发引导雷达网优化部署;同时,提出基于NSGA-Ⅱ的多目标优化部署算法,采用诱导跳跃、基因到位、诱导交叉等候选解生成方式,保持种群多样性,提高算法收敛性。实验表明,部署优化算法耗时较低,不同干扰源部署态势使网络节点部署产生较大差异,多样的候选解生成方法明显提高了算法的收敛速度。     

通信误码率对浮标声纳系统DOA估计性能的影响

浮标声纳受到功耗、体积和硬件复杂度等因素的限制,通常将接收数据通过无线信道发送到终端设备进行处理。由于多径传播、衰落特性以及多普勒效应等众多因素的干扰,信号在无线通信传递中会产生误码并影响最终系统性能。针对复杂传输信道环境下的浮标声纳系统,研究了误码率对系统的多目标方位估计性能的影响,并通过计算机仿真给出了误码率允许的门限。     

脉冲微分方程边值问题的全局分支与多解性

研究非线性脉冲微分方程边值问题,应用分歧技巧,得到非线性脉冲微分方程边值问题多个解的存在性结果.     

机载PD雷达宽带线性调频信号运动补偿

采用宽带线性调频信号能够显著地提高雷达的距离分辨率和抗干扰能力,然而雷达与目标间的相对运动损耗了部分目标回波相参积累能量,影响目标频率向和距离向分辨力。针对以上问题,提出了一种基于改进匹配滤波函数的运动补偿方法,补偿信号回波中的相位误差,实现宽带线性调频信号目标运动运动补偿。实验与仿真结果证明了该算法的有效性。     

穿浪双体船纵向运动模糊PID控制

针对穿浪双体船高速情况下的纵摇和垂荡运动影响乘船舒适性的问题,分析了穿浪双体船的运动规律,给出了其纵向运动控制模型,并根据控制模型的多输入多输出系统特点,分别针对纵摇和升沉两个通道设计了独立的PID控制器。在此基础上,进一步将模糊控制理论应用于PID参数的整定,给出了具体的设计方法,并根据人工经验设计了详细的参数整定规则。经仿真分析表明:模糊逻辑的引入使得PID控制器具备了自适应功能,能够取得更好的减摇效果。     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.