Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO

The disappointingly slow pace of progress on efforts to prevent proliferation, reduce nuclear weapons, and eliminate nuclear risks has many causes. The factor that might be easiest for individuals in the arms control and nonproliferation community to change stems from their own ambivalence about major questions that must be addressed on the road to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to zero. This essay explores how ambivalence about four key issues—strategic stability, alliance relations, institution-building, and nuclear energy—often leads community members to take positions that play well at home and within their like-minded group but raise unintended impediments to achieving their own long-term goals. The author suggests alternative ways to handle these questions to improve the prospects for domestic and international agreement on practical measures that would eliminate, not perpetuate, nuclear risks.     

水面舰艇编队空中威胁扇面角预测模型

针对水面舰艇编队空中威胁扇面角的预测问题,分析了影响空中威胁扇面角大小的主要因素。以具有航路规划能力的远程反舰导弹为对象,从航空兵及远程反舰导弹的作战使用特点和装备性能限制着手,建立了计算威胁扇面角的数学模型。通过仿真分析,得出了主要参数对威胁扇面角的影响规律,为水面舰艇编队对空防御兵力的配置提供了依据。     

基于辅助制导的无人飞行器有向航迹网络图设计

基于辅助制导的无人飞行器多航迹规划是现今航迹规划的主流研究方向之一。飞行器规划空间广,规划过程耗时长,如何提高航迹规划的速度是一个急待解决的问题。因此,提出了一种在预处理过程中生成的、满足战场环境和基于辅助制导无人飞行器飞行特性的有向航迹网络图。该网络图适用于基于辅助制导的无人飞行器多航迹快速规划,使用数据库存储和管理,具有整体数据结构化、易扩充、占用内存资源小、可大大缩短规划时间等优点。     

多无人机梯次攻击航路规划

为了解决多无人机协同攻击航路规划问题,基于一种雷达威胁等效方法,以及无人机在不同姿态下雷达散射截面RCS(Radar Cross-Section)值随之改变的特性,结合多机作战战术思想,提出了一种多无人机梯次协同攻击同一目标的方法,并利用Dijkstra算法进行多无人机航路规划.仿真结果表明,该方法具有更高的应用价值.     

一种利用GPS载波相位姿态测量的方法

GPS初始整周模糊度的求解是利用载波相位进行测量时的关键问题.采用了对系数矩阵进行QR分解的方法,用以降低矩阵的维数.模糊度搜索时,针对Z变换可能会引入多余误差,采用了对称三角分解法对协方差矩阵进行去相关处理.实验与仿真结果表明,定位误差在0.5 cm以内,方位角和仰角误差在0.1°以内.     

“现代教育技术”课程的思政实践理念与路径探讨

“课程思政”是高等学校实现立德树人目标的重要举措,也是“三全育人”的重要环节,目前国内高校普遍开展课程思政建设的探索和实践,“现代教育技术”作为师范类专业一门重要的公共基础必修课程,不仅连接了教育理论与实践,也承担着师德养成和职业规范形成的重要任务,因此本文以《中小学教师职业道德规范》为核心,从教学内容、教学形式、教学活动、教学评价四个方面进行课程思政建设的路径探讨,以期通过课程学习,对师范类学生实现“润物细无声”的精神引领,同时也为其他师范类平台课程的思政建设提供有价值的参考。     

Integrated production scheduling and preventive maintenance planning for a single machine under a cumulative damage failure process

This paper finds the optimal integrated production schedule and preventive maintenance plan for a single machine exposed under a cumulative damage process, and investigates how the optimal preventive maintenance plan interacts with the optimal production schedule. The goal is to minimize the total tardiness. The optimal policy possesses the following properties: Under arbitrary maintenance plan when jobs have common processing time, and different due dates, the optimal production schedule is to order the jobs by earliest due date first rule; and when jobs have common due date and different processing times, the optimal production schedule is shortest processing time first. The optimal maintenance plan is of control limit type under any arbitrary production schedule when machine is exposed under a cumulative damage failure process. Numerical studies on the optimal maintenance control limit of the maintenance plan indicate that as the number of jobs to be scheduled increases, the effect of jobs due dates on the optimal maintenance control limit diminishes. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007