How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.     

The case of Donald Rumsfeld: leadership traps in national security

Taking its point of departure in Donald Rumsfeld’s second term as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), this article analyses the crisis of strategic leadership in Western national security. Three “traps” are identified that explain why Donald Rumsfeld ultimately was a failure as defence secretary and demonstrate the perils of national security governance. These traps are termed the inquisitor trap, the strong leader trap and the delegation trap. It is argued that our understanding of strategic leadership in national security, particularly in defence, can benefit from insights gained from the study of strategic leadership in business. As such, this article engages the recent trend of merging insights from business and military strategy.     

Dealing with disputes in Afghanistan: principles and rules for the tactical level

This article addresses the principles that should guide commanders, and the rules they must adhere to, when dealing with community disputes in Afghanistan. An important feature of these principles and rules is that they have been developed to ensure that coalition forces minimize the harm caused to the local population; and that members of the coalition do not violate their own laws and policies. The principles and rules have also been developed to be consistent with counterinsurgency guidance as practiced in Afghanistan. The article concludes with a number of ‘Dos and Don'ts’ concerning dispute settlement that are relevant for coalition forces dealing with disputes at the tactical level. The article also has two appendices, which are intended to guide commanders to better understand dispute settlement systems in Afghanistan.     

ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

When rational choice theory is applied to the study of terrorism, it is important that attention be given to the derived principles of constrained utility maximization. Particularly useful is the Slutsky equation, which rigorously analyzes the quantity response in one activity to a price change in another. By directing attention to assumptions and/or information about compensated cross price elasticities, expenditure shares, and income elasticities, the Slutsky equation can provide critical guidance in both theoretical and empirical analysis.     

Empirical Investigation into the Determinants of Terrorism: Evidence from Fragile States

Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of terrorism in countries that are in the top category of the Fragile States Index (FSI), and are also prone to terrorism. Panel data for 38 countries mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia for the years 2005–2014 are used. Findings from the negative binomial and fixed effects estimation show that fragile state, number of refugees and youth unemployment have positive and significant impacts on terrorism. Military spending is positive but less robust across models. Conversely, FDI and remittances have a negative impact on terrorism with the former less robust. Governance and foreign aid are negative and insignificantly related to terrorism. Policy implications follow from the findings.     

Peace-building or structural violence? Deconstructing the aftermath of Nigeria/Cameroon boundary demarcation

ABSTRACT

There is a great conviction that the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 2002 on the Bakassi boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and Nigeria’s decision to obey the ruling may have stopped a fierce inter-state war over the boundary. Indeed, many then ascribed to the whole boundary demarcation process as peacebuilding, disregarding the structural changes marked by the violence of forced migration. This article explores how the boundary delimitation has produced particular sorts of structural violence characterised by state neglect, loss of livelihoods and destitution. Thus, the article argues that although a full-blown war was avoided, the socio-economic conditions of the Nigerian populations on both sides of the border were not adequately considered and guaranteed as part of the peace-building agenda. It further argues that Nigeria, like many post-colonial states with the concentration of developments in major cities, neglects rural and border communities. Thus, the border communities accommodating the former Bakassi residents have further degenerated into ‘ill-governed’ spaces. This article uses structural violence as a framework to analyse the primary and secondary data to provide some deeper insights into the issues of violence being experienced by the local populations living on both sides of the demarcated border.     

The Ethics of Cyber Attack: Pursuing Legitimate Security and the Common Good in Contemporary Conflict Scenarios

ABSTRACT

Cyber attack against Critical National Infrastructure is a developing capability in state arsenals. The onset of this new instrument in national security has implications for conflict thresholds and military ethics. To serve as a legitimate tool of policy, cyber attack must operate in accordance with moral concerns. To test the viability of cyber attack, this paper provides a new perspective on cyber ethics. Cyber attack is tested against the criteria of the common good. This involves identifying the four core components of the common good from a conflict perspective: respect for the person; social wellbeing; peace and security; and solidarity. The fate of these components is assessed in relation to the six key characteristics of cyber attack from a moral standpoint: security; the role or absence of violence; discrimination; proportionality; cyberharm; and the threshold of conflict. It is concluded that the common good must be incorporated into developing state cyber strategies.