A transformed insurgency: The strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the light of communist insurgency theories and a modified Beaufrean exterior/interior framework

This paper examines the insurgency in Nepal (1996–2008) from a military theoretical point of view. It looks at the insurgency from André Beaufre's exterior/interior framework, which is modified to match postmodern conflicts. Simultaneously the importance of the political is underlined. The author critically examines the relevance of the Maoist label the movement and insurgency have received. He claims that the insurgency became a hybrid consisting of Chinese, Latin American, and Leninist thoughts wrapped in pragmatic/revisionists and nationalist ideas. The author also suggests that the ability of insurgents – or counter-insurgents – to combine the effects of the exterior and interior is more likely to constitute the key centre of gravity of a conflict than any single political, economic, or military factor.     

Argentina and the Bomb

Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda, by John Mueller. Oxford University Press, 2009. 336 pages, $27.95.

Les armes nucléaires: Mythes et réalités [Nuclear Weapons: Myths and Realities], by Georges Le Guelte. Actes Sud, 2009. 390 pages, [euro]25.     

STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND ATTACK FOR SERIES AND PARALLEL RELIABILITY SYSTEMS: COMMENT

The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases.     

基于灰色系统理论的军队油料节约人员360度绩效评估

基于360度绩效评估理论,从德、能、勤、绩4个方面构建了包含4个1级指标和16个2级指标的军队油料节约人员360度绩效评估指标体系。利用层次分析法确定了各评估指标的权重,运用灰色系统理论的原理和方法,构建了多层次灰色评估模型,并对某油料节约小组5位油料节约人员进行了360度绩效评估。案例应用表明,此方法具有系统综合各层评估者提供的"贫信息"的优点,不仅能得出被评估者的灰类及优劣顺序,而且得到了各指标所属灰类和具体的灰色评价权值,使360度绩效较好地实现了绩效反馈的目的。该研究为军队油料节约人员绩效管理工作提供了新的思路和方法。     

灰色模糊物元分析的要地防空威胁评估

结合要地防空作战的特点,分析了影响目标威胁评估的因素.针对指标信息的不确定性,将模糊物元分析与灰色系统理论相结合,并运用AHP法和信息熵法进行组合赋权,建立了基于组合赋权的灰色模糊物元分析的要地防空威胁评估模型.在对来袭目标进行威胁评估时,将目标的各个特征作为物元的事物,以其各项评价指标及模糊灰量值构造复合模糊灰元.通过计算与标准模糊灰元之间的关联度,实现对空袭目标的威胁评估与排序.实例分析表明该方法可靠有效.     

基于凸优化理论的三维微分对策制导规律求解

针对三维微分对策制导律(DGL)求解问题,引入凸优化理论,将DGL求解归结到Hamilton系统的求解,设计了DGL求解算法,通过对代价函数梯度特征的凸分析,推导出对策系统鞍点存在的充要条件和求解方法,解决了以往通过对微分对策模型简化求解导致的模型不能客观反映作战过程的问题.     

零彗差自由点条件下的失调光学系统波像差特性分析

基于矢量像差理论,对反射式光学系统的一类特殊失调状态——满足零彗差自由点条件展开研究,分析了该特殊失调下三阶彗差和三阶像散的全视场波像差特性,建立了三阶像散双节点位置的解析计算公式,研究发现该类失调不会引入三阶彗差,并且会导致三阶像散的一个节点位于中心视场附近,揭示了当前传统装调方法中仅采用轴上彗差为零作为系统完善装调的弊端,并基于像差特性分析提出了一种仅根据轴上视场引入定量失调误差前后的像差变化来评估系统完善装调的方法。利用CODE V(Version 10.2)对两反式光学系统进行了仿真分析,结果表明文中建立的模型和方法可定量分析三阶像散双节点的位置及该类失调对系统波像差的影响规律,并验证了所提出系统完善装调方法的有效性。     

杂波环境下机动目标跟踪算法研究

杂波环境下的机动目标跟踪问题具有非线性、非高斯、不完全观测的特点,其难点在于观测值与目标的对应关系及每一时刻的运动模式均呈现高度不确定性。文中将多模型理论和辅助粒子滤波算法相结合,提出了一种新的杂波环境下机动目标跟踪算法——多模型辅助粒子滤波算法(MMAPF)。仿真结果表明,该算法与传统的交互多模型——扩展卡尔曼滤波算法、辅助粒子滤波算法相比,在相同的情况下,具有更高的滤波精度和较好总体性能。     

基于D-S推理的灰关联通信电台识别研究

为了解决通信电台识别问题,在灰关联识别的过程中,引入D-S证据理论,通过对信号的积累和对信任度的重新分配,对识别结果进行了有效的融合,提高了辐射源的正确识别率。仿真结果表明了该方法的可行性和有效性。     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007