TETRA直通模式移动台协议仿真

作为 TETRA 通信的一种方式,TETRA DMO 使得 TETRA 移动台在没有设置基站以及基站覆盖范围之外的地区、系统出现故障或过载以至难以快速接人时可以不经过网络基础设施直接进行相互的通信,从而降低了移动台通信对基站的依赖性,扩展了移动台通信的地理范围。文中首先依照协议对直通模式移动台通信方式和呼叫接续过程进行了介绍,并描述了利用工具 SDL and TTCN suite 4.5对其中的电路模式呼叫流程编程、仿真的过程,最后对仿真的结果进行了简要说明。     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

A refined deterministic linear program for the network revenue management problem with customer choice behavior

We present a new deterministic linear program for the network revenue management problem with customer choice behavior. The novel aspect of our linear program is that it naturally generates bid prices that depend on how much time is left until the time of departure. Similar to the earlier linear program used by van Ryzin and Liu (2004), the optimal objective value of our linear program provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue over the planning horizon. In addition, the percent gap between the optimal objective value of our linear program and the optimal total expected revenue diminishes in an asymptotic regime where the leg capacities and the number of time periods in the planning horizon increase linearly with the same rate. Computational experiments indicate that when compared with the linear program that appears in the existing literature, our linear program can provide tighter upper bounds, and the control policies that are based on our linear program can obtain higher total expected revenues. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Detection of a Markovian target with optimization of the search efforts under generalized linear constraints

This paper deals with search for a target following a Markovian movement or a conditionally deterministic motion. The problem is to allocate the search efforts, when search resources renew with generalized linear constraints. The model obtained is extended to resource mixing management. New optimality equations of de Guenin's style are obtained. Practically, the problem is solved by using an algorithm derived from the FAB method. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 117–142, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10009     

Dynamic pricing and inventory control with learning

Optimal operating policies and corresponding managerial insight are developed for the decision problem of coordinating supply and demand when (i) both supply and demand can be influenced by the decision maker and (ii) learning is pursued. In particular, we determine optimal stocking and pricing policies over time when a given market parameter of the demand process, though fixed, initially is unknown. Because of the initially unknown market parameter, the decision maker begins the problem horizon with a subjective probability distribution associated with demand. Learning occurs as the firm monitors the market's response to its decisions and then updates its characterization of the demand function. Of primary interest is the effect of censored data since a firm's observations often are restricted to sales. We find that the first‐period optimal selling price increases with the length of the problem horizon. However, for a given problem horizon, prices can rise or fall over time, depending on how the scale parameter influences demand. Further results include the characterization of the optimal stocking quantity decision and a computationally viable algorithm. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 303–325, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10013     

考虑刚度影响的双输入转矩分流式齿轮系统均载特性

为了对转矩分流齿轮系统均载特性进行更加深入的研究,建立系统非线性动力学模型,采用数值仿真方法计算系统的均载系数,分析联动轴扭转刚度、输出轴支撑刚度、输入转速以及轴位角对均载系数的影响规律,并对齿轮系统进行实验研究.研究结果表明:输出端的均载系数大于输入端的均载系数,高压输入端的均载系数大于低压输入端的均载系数;均载系数...     

高炮群射击能力评估

为提高高炮群射击能力,根据高炮群射击能力的影响因素,针对评判高炮群射击能力大小的三项指标:射击密度、射击时间、毁歼概率,构建了射击能力计算的相关模型,并进行了实例计算与分析,为评估高炮群射击能力提供了一种新的思路和方法。该方法较好地解决了在要地防空作战中高炮群射击能力的评估问题。