A reply to Larry cable

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.     

Winning hearts and minds to lose control: exploring various consequences of popular support in counterinsurgency missions

The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency.     

基于多变元网络的Cyber作战建模方法

Cyberspace是近年出现的一个新概念,分析了Cyberspace的概念及特性,提出Cyberspace层次概念模型,在此基础上,提出基于多变元网络的Cyber作战建模方法,认为Cyber作战建模可以分为对战争系统静态结构建模和交战行为动态交互建模,并对应分别建立了Cyberspace战争系统的多变元网络模型和Cyber作战交战行为的多变元网络演化模型,最后运用所建立的模型对一个典型Cyber战进行了分析.     

Book reviews

The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5

Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p.

Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3     

AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS

This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years.     

两栖作战装备体系综合效能评估初探

文章通过研究两栖作战的构成要素,设计提出两栖作战装备体系的基本构成,提出两栖作战装备体系的综合效能评估方法和应用实例,为海军两栖作战装备体系的发展提供参考。     

基于技术和装备最新发展研究把握现代战争制胜机理

技术和装备发展对现代战争具有革命性的影响。基于技术和装备发展的现代战争制胜机理主要有:感知驱动、数据制胜,网络聚能、体系制胜,精确行动、集约制胜,迅捷灵敏、快速制胜,综合制权,主动制胜。认识和把握现代战争制胜机理应着重强调技术素养、战术技术有机融合,定性定量各有侧重。     

透视德军心理战部队

历经第二次世界大战和冷战时期后,德军心理战部队朝量小、质精的目标发展。冷战结束东、西德统一后,德军配合北约组织执行索马里、波斯尼亚及阿富汗等国维和任务,心理战部队一方面以实务经验精进其作业能力,另一方面在多国维和任务中汲取他国长处,以传播科技增进其执行效能。