‘Mad Dog?’ Samuel Huntington and the Vietnam War

Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has frequently been considered a Vietnam War hawk. His observation that ‘forced-draft urbanization’ might help the United States win the war has come to define his engagement in contemporary strategic debates. This essay argues that both Huntington’s academic work and his private policy advice to the U.S. Government in fact urged a political settlement to the conflict. It argues that in spite of this, Huntington refused to break publicly with the U.S. policy because of his wider concern over what he saw as a crisis of authority in the U.S. foreign policy and governing institutions in the era.     

Small footprint,small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance

After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.     

A nation-in-the-making,in arms: control of force,strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions

At the core of waging war and strategy is the creation, control and use of force. This article investigates the volunteer battalions that mobilized in Ukraine during the spring of 2014. It contextualizes the volunteer phenomenon and focuses on the state strategies to establish control over these militias. As ambiguous entities arising from a situation characterized by rapid social change – revolution and war – the volunteer battalions threatened existing hierarchies and questioned state authority. The situation was exacerbated by the war, which deviated from the expectations of Ukrainian combatants and Western military observers alike. The state nevertheless enjoyed a modicum of success in reining in the militias through four strategies of undermining, co-option, incorporation and coercion. While predominantly integrated into a more rigid category of paramilitary forces, the volunteers continue to play a role in both the Ukrainian society and security sector to the unforeseeable future.     

The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies

ABSTRACT

The United States has provided substantial amounts of military assistance and aid since the end of World War Two. During the Cold War, it proved vital in protecting numerous regimes from communist takeovers. Successful outcomes occurred when American leaders made large initial aid commitments, and the states had the capacity and political willpower to use it effectively. However, Vietnam was an example of how U.S. support lagged, as leaders in Saigon preferred political survival instead of creating regime legitimacy. Following 9/11, American security aid focused on making weak countries develop stronger security forces. Unfortunately, this created Fabergé egg militaries: expensive and easily broken by insurgents. This article suggests long-term strategic commitments need to be made alongside more resources for the American State Department and similar organizations to focus on the politics of state-building. Finally, this article suggests strategies, such as “whole-of-government” approaches, to improve long-term security and political institution building.     

Effective in battle: conceptualizing soldiers’ combat effectiveness*

How do we understand combat effectiveness – soldiers’ performance in battle? Despite the broad consensus that understanding combat effectiveness is important both for scholars and policymakers, there is widespread disagreement about what combat effectiveness is. More specifically, studies of effectiveness tend to focus on either the skill of soldiers in battle, or their will to fight. Yet both skill and will are essential components of an effective fighting force. This article argues that understanding combat effectiveness requires understanding both of these key components of effectiveness. In other words, combat effectiveness requires both the skill and will to engage the enemy in an organized manner. It then demonstrates the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of British, Indian, and Australian forces fighting the Japanese during the Second World War. Only when scholars are talking about the same concept will our understanding of the conditions under which militaries are effective in battle progress. By comparing different units fighting the same opponent under the same material conditions, I demonstrate that units vary both in their combat skill and their will to fight, and that understanding their effectiveness in battle requires analyzing both of these key factors.     

Governing risks in international security

Risks are omnipresent in contemporary international security. Despite a long tradition in security studies going at least back to Von Clausewitz, we consider that the topic of risk remains under-examined. This forum seeks to advance the research agenda on risk in security studies by showcasing work of scholars using advanced concepts of risk, based on insights from sociology, biology, psychology, and safety studies, to better understand the role of risk in international security. As a way of introduction, this short article sets out the main debates.     

Optimality of the greedy shooting strategy in the presence of incomplete damage information

Consider a situation where a single shooter engages, sequentially, a cluster of targets that may vary in terms of vulnerability and value or worth. Following the shooting of a round of fire at a certain target, the latter may either be killed or remain alive. We assume neither partial nor cumulative damage. If the target is killed, there is a possibility that the shooter is not aware of that fact and may keep on engaging that target. If the shooter recognizes a killed target as such, then this target is considered to be evidently killed. If the objective is to maximize the weighted expected number of killed targets, where the weight reflects the value of a target, then it is shown that a certain type of a shooting strategy, called a Greedy Strategy, is optimal under the general assumption that the more a target is engaged, but still not evidently killed, the less is the probability that the next round will be effective. If all weights are equal, then the greedy shooting strategy calls to engage, at each round, the least previously engaged target that is not evidently killed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 613–622, 1997     

美军战略传播中的“叙事”策略

随着互联网技术的飞速发展,信息传播对国家政治、经济、外交和国防带来巨大冲击和影响。美军意识到传播叙事是政府和军队塑造形象、谋划战略、输出文化价值观的重要手段。美国从"重讲故事"的角度出发,将"叙事"包装成对外战略传播的新型方式,从思维认知、情感操控、舆论引导等方面强化对对手的心理威慑和影响,同时以新媒体为媒介扩大叙事传播的影响受众,进而达到物理打击所难以发挥的影响。     

Improvise,adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building,culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.     

全球导航卫星系统诱导式欺骗检测

随着全球导航卫星系统的广泛应用,其安全性问题也逐渐成为人们关注的焦点。为了对目前最具隐蔽性的诱导式欺骗技术进行检测,提出一种对两路导航信号同时进行处理的combo-signal模型,并提出基于这种信号处理模型来对诱导式欺骗信号进行检测的方法;分析了该方法的检测门限;采用北斗的B1I 和B1C信号在实现了combo-signal处理模型的软件接收机上对该检测方法进行了验证,实验结果证明该方法可以有效地对诱导式欺骗进行检测,统计得到的检测概率跟前面的分析结果一致。