French intervention in Mali: strategic alliances,long-term regional presence?

The March 2012 coup in Mali opened the door to expanded territorial occupation in northern Mali by Tuareg separatists and subsequently armed Islamist extremists. French forces intervened at the behest of the interim government in Mali. This article examines how various actors frame the conflict to their advantage. While the Malian government and France are allies, the position of various Tuareg actors shift over time as they strategize and weigh the value of allegiance with the French. Local extremist organizations are labeled as terrorists and are targeted as enemies. This article argues that the conflict has been decontextualized and framed within the ‘war on terror’. France’s decision to intervene and to expand their regional military presence, rather than exit, is legitimized by the framing of their intervention as integral to counterterrorism efforts.     

基于心理干预的高校班级教学管理模式的探索

所谓班级教学管理模式,是以教学班级为管理单元,以班主任对班级事务和工作全面负责为特征,以充分发挥学生的主体作为核心的管理形式,其实质是班主任负责制。本文是通过借鉴企业管理中的团队合作精神、企业文化的打造、企业中的竞争机制、奖惩机制等,在班级中创造和模拟企业情境,培养学生在学习上的竞争意识和团队协作精神,以适应未来企业和社会发展的需求,构建一种全新的班级教学管理模式。     

关于大学生心理危机干预工作的几点思考

目前大学生的心理危机现象频繁出现,存在心理健康问题的大学生呈逐年上升趋势。就大学生心理危机的原因和表现、辅导员心理危机干预应该坚持的基本原则、辅导员危机干预的几个步骤等问题进行了探讨。     

Memory,magic and militias: Cora Indian participation in Mexico’s wars,from the reforma to the revolution (1854-1920)

ABSTRACT

Mexico’s Cora Indians have played an outsized role in national history, thanks to their skilful use of guerrilla tactics and success in forging strategic alliances with outside forces in defence of their cultural, territorial and political autonomy. Cora participation in elite struggles between Liberals and Conservatives (1850–73), and subsequently in the Mexican Revolution (1910–20), helped to shape the way that both conflicts played out in Western Mexico. Such participation also allowed Cora communities to keep hold of traditional landholdings in the face of political and economic reform, while sowing the seeds for the foundation of the Mexican state of Nayarit.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

Helping hands: civil–military cooperation and Italy's military operation abroad

In the Post-Bipolar Era the growing complexity of the military operations requires a new approach for the resolution of international crises. Since the end of the Cold War, peace support operations (PSO) have become the mainstay and principal occupation of most Western armies. At the same time, Italy has been one of the most important actors in such an area. The article focuses on the cooperation between military and civil components (a process called CIMIC) as a key variable in the Italian PSOs. We will analyse in detail the main lessons learned from past military interventions as well as the general context in which new tendencies are taking place. The maintaining of a minimum security frame becomes essential to fulfil activities ‘collateral’ to the mission: reconstructing services and infrastructure, food distribution, water and medication, law and order, de-mining, training of local forces, and supporting local institutions. These are the main tasks to obtain thrust and support from the population.     

Pragmatism over principle: US intervention and burden shifting in Somalia, 1992–1993

ABSTRACT

The conventional wisdom about the 1992 US intervention in Somalia is that it was a quintessentially humanitarian mission pushed by President George H. W. Bush. This article challenges that interpretation, drawing on newly declassified documents. The Somalia intervention, I argue, was largely a pragmatic response to concerns held by the US military. In late 1992, as the small UN mission in Somalia was collapsing, senior American generals worried about being drawn into the resulting vacuum. Hence they reluctantly recommended a robust US intervention, in the expectation that this would allow the UN to assemble a larger peacekeeping force that would take over within months. The intervention ultimately failed, but the military learned useful lessons from this experience on how to achieve smoother UN handoffs in the future and thus effectively shift longer-term stabilisation burdens to the international community.