舰载机多机一体化机务保障调度研究

针对舰载机多机一体化机务保障调度问题,以出树、入树的形式描述实际保障过程中并行工序的约束关系,以最大保障完工时间和资源负载均衡性为目标,构建了舰载机多机一体化机务保障非线性多目标混合流水车间调度模型,并设计了一种结合基于Insert的动态邻域爬山搜索策略和并行工序的同步化修正的Memetic算法求解该模型。最后通过实例仿真验证了模型和所提算法的可行性和有效性。     

认知电子战综述

认知电子战通常被定义为以具备认知性能的电子战装备为基础,注重自主交互式的电磁环境学习能力与动态智能化的对抗任务处理能力的电子战形态。自其被首次提出以来,以其感知准、推理强、决策快的优势备受国内外研究学者广泛关注。随着人工智能新理念、新技术、新应用的不断涌现,认知电子战步入崭新的发展阶段。为捕捉其未来发展方向,从人工智能角度出发,总结并丰富了认知电子战概念内涵,梳理认知电子战的发展脉络及外国典型项目,搭建认知电子战系统框架及架构,从感知、判断、决策等方面对认知听电子战关键技术进行了全面系统综述,并总结了认知电子战面临的挑战和发展趋势。     

混合动力装甲车辆能量管理策略实时仿真

为解决混合动力装甲车辆多动力源输出优化匹配难题,针对一种具有3个动力源的混合动力系统中各动力源的输出特性和驱动电机功率需求特点,制定了具有双层结构的能量管理策略:顶层的系统功率分配策略完成负载功率估计及其在各动力源间的分配;底层的部件级控制策略实现发动机-发电机组和动力电池的优化控制。通过构建一种分布式硬件在环仿真平台对能量管理策略进行仿真验证。结果表明:混合动力系统能够很好地满足负载功率需求,实现了对多个目标的优化控制。     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

Statistical analysis for masked system life data from Marshall‐Olkin Weibull distribution under progressive hybrid censoring

This paper considers the statistical analysis of masked data in a series system, where the components are assumed to have Marshall‐Olkin Weibull distribution. Based on type‐I progressive hybrid censored and masked data, we derive the maximum likelihood estimates, approximate confidence intervals, and bootstrap confidence intervals of unknown parameters. As the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist for small sample size, Gibbs sampling is used to obtain the Bayesian estimates and Monte Carlo method is employed to construct the credible intervals based on Jefferys prior with partial information. Numerical simulations are performed to compare the performances of the proposed methods and one data set is analyzed.     

对岸电子进攻中航母阵位确定方法?

针对航母编队对岸电子进攻作战提出了一种航母编队阵位确定的方法。基于航母编队在对岸电子进攻中的任务,提出了航母编队与岸边距离的基本要求,建立了航母编队与岸边距离的数学模型,仿真计算了模型中各个参数对航母编队与岸边距离的影响。这些模型可用于航母编队在对岸电子进攻中确定航母的阵位,满足航母编队作战使用的需要。     

The insurgency of the Vendée

The insurrection in the Vendée combined open warfare with the methods of petite guerre, ambushing French republican soldiers and cutting their supply lines to Paris. These tactics, when combined with the hatreds generated by a civil war, go far to explain to the cruelty of the conflict in the west and the depth of the hatreds it engendered. In republican eyes the use of guerrilla tactics was unjust and illegitimate, and they denounced their adversaries as common criminals and brigands, portraying them as backward, superstitious, even as subhuman, and in the process justified the savage repression they unleashed against them.     

Initiating insurgencies abroad: French plans to ‘chouannise’ Britain and Ireland, 1793–1798

Secret French plans to launch guerrilla-style raids on the British Isles devised in the spring of 1796 were referred to as ‘chouanneries’. The name and concept behind these small-war operations were modelled on the irregular tactics used by the Chouan rebels in the Vendée, which the French state army had brutally quashed, but some wished to transfer into their institutional practice. Part of France's ongoing military strategy in the war against Britain, which included fomenting insurrection in Ireland, these irregular operations were to be manned partially by pardoned deserters and released convicts and prisoners of war. Of these, only Tate's brief invasion of Wales in 1797 was realised, but the surviving plans provide insightful historical lessons into an Anglophobic mindset shared by a small network of practitioners and policy deciders on the effectiveness of such shock and awe tactics. Largely motivated by the desire to take revenge for Britain's support of counter-revolutionaries in the Vendée, these plans could more aptly be referred to as counter-‘chouanneries’.     

The evolution of Hezbollah's strategy and military performance, 1982–2006

This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982–2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence.     

A Re-assessment of the Japanese Armaments Production During World War II*

Abstract

This paper examines the nexus between the Japanese strategy and economic–industrial mobilization during the period 1937–1945. From 1937 to December 1941, the country was engaged in a land war of attrition in China. This war requested an immense amount of resources and was associated with armaments procurement strategy with emphasis in the army. However, the Japanese strategic vision assumed that the state was strong enough to engage in one land war against China and in a naval war in the Pacific simultaneously. The basis of Japanese strategy was a utopia. Making things worse, the naval war in the Pacific was conducted against the most industrialized powers in the world [the US and the British Empire (Britain, Australia, India, etc.)]. Finally, the internal Japanese industrial mobilization was associated with immense errors in armaments production (absence of economies of scale and scope, limited raw materials, etc.). Under these circumstances, the defeat was an expected outcome.