基于多Agent的分布式防空战场资源管理研究

分布式防空战场资源管理是构建现代防空体系的核心问题。基于对分布式防空战场资源管理特点的分析,提出了基于多智能体(Agent)的分布式防空战场资源管理体系结构,并深入分析了该管理系统的组成和功能,为实现定性和定量相结合的防空战场资源管理的综合集成,提供了一条有效的途径。     

云重心理论在防空兵作战能力评估中的运用

防空兵作战能力评估是一个复杂的多指标综合体系,不仅与作战编组、部署、地形和敌我战场情况的处置等因素有关,而且还包含许多随机和模糊因素。在建模分析中各指标基本评定值确定比较困难。结合防空兵作战能力评估模型,运用“云重心”理论确定了评估模型中各指标基本评定值,增强了模型的可信度和可操作性。     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化

党的十八届三中全会首次提出“推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化”,并将其作为全面深化改革的总目标。本文从国家治理理念的转变、国家治理现代化的核心内容和本质特征三个方面,阐释了在当代中国完善和发展中国特色社会主义制度,必须推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化。     

以改革创新精神切实加强领导班子建设

要以改革创新精神切实加强各项建设。加强思想建设,首先要明确指导思想,其关键是求真务实;加强组织建设,最重要的是坚持和完善民主集中制;加强能力建设,主要是着力培养和增强五种能力;加强作风建设,必须坚持党的三大作风;加强反腐倡廉建设,既要抓预防,又要抓惩治;加强制度建设,是领导班子各项建设的保证。     

基于感知信息共享的C2网络特征分析

指挥控制（C2,Commandand Control）关系网络连接数的增加会增强指控节点之间的信息共享,但也会增加节点信息处理和交换负荷,如果达到一定程度,则会造成节点本身的“信息过载”从而影响C2网络性能。对此,通过研究C2网络在两种不同处理方式下的共享感知信息平均提交时间,用网络节点响应时间的均方差表征一个C2网络的共享态势感知时间的一致性,最后对两种不同结构C2网络特征参数的计算,说明了网络连接增加会导致信息提交时间的延长,但一致性会增强。     

浅谈现代远程教育对武警院校教学的深远影响

武警院校拥有丰富的教育资源,依托武警部队日益健全的内部网络系统,大力开展现代远程教育,能够更加紧密院校与部队的联系,及时了解部队的需求,制定出更加符合部队实际的课程体系,更大限度发挥现有教学资源的效益。由于远程教育具有方便快捷,受时间、空间局限小的特性,弥补了由于武警部队点多、线长、面广,分布相对分散,导致部队官兵学习时间不固定、人员难以集中等不便的问题,为武警部队官兵获取文化知识,学习科学技术提供了新的途径。     

多光源并行化算法的实现

针对在绘制具有真实感的图形中光照处理模块串行处理速度慢的问题,提出多光源光照算法的并行化,采用负载均衡的并行策略,重新优化计算模型,单独计算环境光、散射光、镜面光及衰减因子后叠加在一起。计算不同的PE(处理单元)个数使用了不同的分配方案来提高处理速度。实验结果表明,将多光源光照算法并行化,可充分利用资源,发挥多核处理器的处理能力,提高了资源利用率。     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

Buy now,pay later: American military intervention and the strategic cost paradox

This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.