一种基于随机映射的战斗效能模型

利用随机映射概念提出了一种新的战斗毁伤模型形式———Lanchester战斗网络模型。模型是由一个阶递减的随机映射序列组成的随机有向二部图,它明确、形式地描述了战争整体行为与局部作用之间的关系。理论分析和计算获得的结论表明,模型描述的整体作战效能符合Lanchester平方律,其网络拓扑结构是非同质的,出度和入度分布服从指数幂律。应用模型定量对比了“对称”与“非对称”战斗中全局信息因素对战斗系统整体效能的影响。初步讨论了网络模型研究在战争建模理论、实证和计算方法论上的意义。     

超低轨道卫星摄动特性分析及轨道维持方法

针对超低轨道卫星长时间在轨飞行的轨道维持问题,分析了超低轨道平均偏心率矢量变化特性,提出了一种超低轨道维持的控制方法。分析了J2、J3摄动以及大气阻力摄动作用下超低轨道卫星偏心率矢量的变化特性;基于能量守恒原理设计了超低轨道高度维持的控制策略;通过仿真算例验证了控制策略的有效性。结果表明:在地球非球形引力摄动、大气阻力摄动和速度脉冲作用下超低轨道平均偏心率的变化是稳定的,所设计的轨道维持方法不仅能够实现超低轨道高度维持,确保平均偏心率矢量收敛至平衡位置,且用于轨道维持的燃料消耗合理,能够满足长时间的超低轨道飞行要求。     

单框架控制力矩陀螺部分失效时的空间站姿态机动方法

对金字塔构型单框架控制力矩陀螺(SGCMG)的失效特性进行分析。结合SGCMG部分失效的特点,构建运用Legendre伪谱法的重规划姿态机动路径求解方法。考虑SGCMG失效情况的不可预测性,设计自适应操纵律,该操纵律可以根据指令力矩与输出力矩的偏差对SGCMG的失效情况进行诊断,从而调节操纵律的内部参数,实现失效情况操纵律的自适应调节。仿真结果表明,采用姿态机动路径重规划算法与自适应操纵律,在控制力矩陀螺部分失效的情况下,仍可以实现空间站的大角度姿态机动。姿态机动方法可以有效应对空间站大角度姿态机动过程中可能出现的SGCMG部分失效情况,从而提高空间站姿态机动任务的安全性与可靠性。     

基于Gauss伪谱法的空空导弹最优中制导律设计

研究Gauss伪谱法在空空导弹最优中制导律设计中的应用。建立空空导弹中制导律设计问题最优控制模型,首次提出采用Gauss伪谱法求解最优中制导律设计问题的思路,详细阐述了求解流程,通过仿真算例验证了求解方法的有效性,并同比例导引、打靶法等传统方法进行了对比。仿真结果表明,综合考虑性能指标、计算精度、计算效率等因素,Gauss伪谱法具有明显优势,Gauss伪谱法求解结果和求解效率与配点个数密切相关。研究结果为空空导弹中制导律设计提供理论参考。     

高空气球地面充氦气量计算方法分析与试验评估

作为高空气球研究中的一个重要问题,气球在地面发放前充入的氦气量会直接影响其上升速度和驻空高度,进而影响平台的可靠性和稳定性。因此研究充氦气量的准确计算方法十分必要。建立了高空气球上升过程动力学模型,计算了气球初始升速的理论值,用于与实际初始升速对比,为评估充氦气量计算方法提供依据。归纳了三种较为典型的高空气球地面充氦气量计算方法,根据实际开展的飞行试验,分析对比了三种方法的准确性和误差范围。提出了浮力补偿规律,完成了对三种方法的评估。通过研究可以对现有充氦气量计算方法进行有效修正,进而为高空气球的实际飞行提供指导。     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.     

Becoming a disarmament champion: the Austrian crusade against nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

The making of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has put Austria and its involvement in nuclear disarmament in the spotlight. This study highlights several factors that led Austria to become a prominent voice in nuclear-disarmament debates. First, its involvement dovetails with the emphasis on humanitarian disarmament it has promoted since the 1990s. Second, a strong antinuclear identity pervades Austrian society. This “nuclear allergy” combines antimilitarism inherited from the Cold War and, more broadly, an aversion to nuclear power, including for energy purposes. These two considerations form the background to the increased activism of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament in international fora. But, equally, Austria’s crusade for the TPNW can be attributed to the engagement of a small team of diplomats implementing personal as well as national preferences in favor of disarmament.