Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

基于分阶段筛选评估的合同网任务分配机制

基于合同网的任务分配机制广泛应用于各领域的多Agent系统中,以解决分布式任务分配问题。在分析经典合同网协议优缺点的基础上,提出了分阶段筛选与招投标协商相结合的任务分配模型。通过招投标的可计算性评估,将主要计算任务放在招投标Agent内部进行并且缩小招投标范围,从而减少通信并提高效率;通过动态确定评估指标提高了机制的通用性。     

Rolling‐horizon replenishment: Policies and performance analysis

We consider a rolling‐horizon (RH) replenishment modeling framework under which a buyer can update demand information and inventory status, modify order quantities committed previously, place an advanced order for a new period at the end of the RH, and move along in time seamlessly. We show that the optimal order policy for the two‐period RH problem is a dual‐threshold type for updating period(s) plus a base‐stock type for the advanced order. We provide analytical formulas and algorithms to compute the optimal thresholds and the optimal base‐stock level exactly. With our analytical results and numerical procedures, we demonstrate the significant value of RH replenishment in matching supplies to demands more closely. We also show that with RH updating (flexibility), the value of additional demand information beyond the RH diminishes quickly. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

聘用制下高校教师雇佣关系转变分析

教师聘用制改革是高校人事制度改革的重点和核心,是在遵循双方地位平等的原则上,以合同方式明确规定双方的权利、义务和责任的一种任用方式。教师聘用制的实施使高校与教师之间的雇佣关系本质发生了转变。本文从心理契约、职业生涯等方面对此进行分析,并指出在新雇佣关系下的成功要素。     

装备采办市场的逆向选择及其根治策略——一种根治采办市场逆向选择的机制设计

在分析装备采办市场逆向选择的基础上,从军方对军工企业支付合同的设计出发,提出了一种根治装备采办市场逆向选择的可行的可实施机制,该机制对我军建立相关制度、采取相关措施以防范和根治装备采办市场的逆向选择具有一定的借鉴和指导意义.     

析行政法的平衡论

从行政立法、行政执法、权力手段的淡化、行政救济制度的出现等方面论述了平衡论是现代行政法的精义 ,并阐明了以平衡论指导行政法的重大意义及如何正确、全面看待平衡论。     

谈激励机制在基层部队思想政治工作中的运用

介绍激励机制在基层部队思想政治工作中的运用 ,选取了在基层部队思想政治工作中比较实用的五种激励方法 ,论述了其在工作中的运用和在运用中应注意的误区与问题 ,旨在使基层带兵人掌握科学的激励方法 ,做好部队战士的思想政治工作 ,提高部队的战斗力。     

Trade credit contract in the presence of retailer investment opportunity

This paper presents a model for designing a trade credit contract between a supplier and a retailer that would coordinate a supply chain in the presence of investment opportunity for the retailer. Specifically, we study a newsvendor model where the supplier offers a trade credit contract to the retailer who, by delaying the payment, can invest the accounts payable amount and earn returns. We find that when the channel partners have symmetric information about the retailer's investment return, a conditionally concessional trade credit (CTC) contract, which includes a wholesale price, an interest‐free period, and a minimum order requirement, can achieve channel coordination. We then extend the model to the information asymmetry setting in which the retailer's investment return is unobservable by the supplier. We show that, although the CTC contract cannot achieve the coordination in this setting, it can effectively improve channel efficiency as well as profitability for individual partners.     

Optimal redesign decisions through failure rate estimates

To reduce the time-to-market of newly developed systems, manufacturers increasingly adopt strategies where systems are brought to market while system field reliability is still uncertain. These systems are typically sold under performance-based contracts, which incentivizes potential customers to invest in them despite reliability uncertainty. Such contracts make the manufacturer (partly) responsible for the availability of the system. Subsequently, when field reliability is lower than anticipated, the manufacturer may choose to redesign the system to avoid high contract penalties. Redesign is a costly effort which may substantially increase field reliability. Deciding when to redesign is challenging, especially because the initial failure rate estimate by the system's engineers is refined over time as failure data accrues. We propose a model that endogenizes the failure rate updating to analyze this tactical redesign decision. We study additive and multiplicative redesigns and show that the optimal policy has a control limit structure. We benchmark our optimal policy against a static counterpart numerically, and conclude that basing redesign decisions on the updated estimate of the failure rate can substantially reduce costs.     

关于在公安现役部队推行全面预算管理的几点思考

对现阶段公安现役部队全面预算管理现状和面临的问题进行了分析,从确定部队战略目标,党委重视和全员参与,构建全面预算管理组织结构及制度体系,全面预算的编制、控制、调整及考评等几个方面提出了有效实施全面预算管理的思路和具体措施。